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RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY TAX ABATEMENT:
TESTING A MODEL OF NEIGHBORHOOD IMPACT
DOREEN SWETKIS

ABSTRACT
Using a quasi-experimental research design, this study examines the relationship
between residential property tax abatement for new construction, and urban
neighborhoods in four Ohio cities. Neighborhoods were defined as census tract. The
purpose of this research is to determine if there is a statistically significant relationship at
p < .05 between residential property tax abatement programs for new construction and
several different measures of neighborhood outcomes. The neighborhood outcome
measures can be grouped under the broad concepts of increased private investment, blight
removal, decreased criminal activity, and property tax equity. Subsequent questions
investigated are the direction of these relationships and the existence of a threshold level
at which point relationships become significant. The utilization of a comparable
comparison group addresses the counterfactual scenario. Independence of samples tests
and multivariate cubic regression are employed to answer the research questions.
Results indicate that there are no discernable effects between residential property tax
abatement and the indicators of neighborhood change as defined in the study. Second,
there appears to be no threshold at which the number of tax abated residential units
becomes significantly associated with the indicators of neighborhood change. Third,
there were no significant differences on the indicators of neighborhood change between
subject and comparison groups. In essence, there are no effects from residential tax
abatement policy seen at the neighborhood level.
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Evaluation of programs needs to take into account program objectives other than just
economic development, for example, do they actually help solve social problems.
~ B. Guy Peters, 1999, pp. 60-61.

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

1.1 Purpose of the study and statement of the problem
If the frequent and enduring use of tax incentive programs in Ohio cities is any
indication, then one could conclude elected officials perceive such policies as effective or
at the minimum, necessary evils used to compete with other communities and states.
Empowered by state government, local jurisdictions in Ohio can (and often do) grant tax
incentives to attract new or retain current homeowners and businesses. The effectiveness
of such incentives for residential development has been debated in newspapers (e.g.,
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 2007; The Plain Dealer, 2007; Toledo Blade, 2008; Dayton
Daily News, 2009), on community blogs (e.g., Green City Blue Lake;
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blog.cleveland.com) and in government chambers, as well as in the academic literature
(e.g., Simons & Sharkey, 1997; Dalehite, Mikesell, & Zorn, 2005).
Tax incentives are often rationalized in terms of achieving broad public policy
objectives such as increased investment (e.g., City of Toledo Department of
Development, 2008; Columbus City Bulletin, 2005; City of Dayton, 2003), elimination of
blight (e.g., Cleveland City Record, 1999) decrease in criminal activity (e.g., Toledo
Ordinance No. 170-04, 2004), and promotion of neighborhood stability (e.g., City of
Columbus Department of Development, 2006; City of Cleveland, 1990). Evaluating such
programs to determine if goals and objectives are being met is often overlooked. This
study will examine the relationship between one such policy incentive, residential
property tax abatement programs for new construction (herein referred to as “RPTA”),
and urban neighborhoods in four Ohio cities. The purpose of this research is to determine
if there is a statistically significant relationship between RPTA and several different
measures of neighborhood outcomes: (1) home purchase mortgage loan applications,
(2) home purchase mortgage application approval rates, (3) the median amount of home
purchase loans originated, (5) number of businesses in a neighborhood, (6) type and
number of crimes and (7) vertical equity in property taxation. This evaluation is modeled
after Galster, Hayes, Boxall and Johnson’s (2005) work that focused on developing a set
of robust, parsimonious indicators of neighborhood change, and the work of Galster,
Hayes and Johnson (2004) and their examination of the impact of place-based public
programs in changing the trajectories of neighborhoods indicators.
The four cities in this study, Cleveland, Columbus, Dayton and Toledo, provide
an interesting group to examine, as each has tailored RPTA programs to fit local
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objectives. The local character associated with each city’s RPTA program allows for
intra-state comparisons of the broader Ohio policy and evokes an additional set of
important questions regarding RPTA policy implementation including the effects of
abatement levels, the concentration of abated properties, and the duration of abatements
on each indicator of success. Simons and Sharkey (1997) conducted a cost-benefit
analysis on several RPTA projects in Cleveland and concluded that the duration of
abatement (fifteen years) may be too long, resulting in a deficit for the city if extended
beyond ten years. Conversely Bier, Mikelbank, Horn, Post and Rosentraub (2007)
concluded in their study of Cleveland’s RPTA program that increasing the duration from
ten to fifteen years resulted in a spike in residential construction and an increase in the
city’s tax revenues. This study influenced the recent political decision made by
Cleveland City Council, which was to renew the current RPTA program at 15 years, 100
percent for new construction (Cleveland City Council, 2007).
The data in Table 1 describe the four cities. The estimated change of certain
socio-demographic characteristics is useful in providing a context for a study on RPTA.
The data were taken from the actual count for the 2000 U.S. Census and the estimated
figures derived from the 2005-2007 American Community Survey (U.S. Bureau of the
Census, 2008). The following estimates are illustrative of possible trends occurring in
these cities. Additionally, the City of Columbus is unique in that it has increased its
population through annexation of several surrounding areas. Dayton is unique in that the
percentage of owner-occupied homes is projected to decrease, while increasing in the
other cities. This trend may reflect that Dayton is a community hit particularly hard by
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the foreclosure crisis, which may also have resulted in the median housing values being
grossly over-estimated.

Table 1
Estimated Percent Changes in Socio-Demographic Characteristics from 2000 to 2005-07
City

Population

White

Black

Owneroccupied
units

Median value
owner-occupied
units

Housing units
built 00-07 as
percent of total
housing units

Cleveland

-15.3

-19.7

-12.3

+6.3

+18.9

2.7

Columbus

+1.7

-1.7

+8.9

+14.6

+26.2

10.5

Dayton

-11.7

-12.7

-9.7

-4.1

+20.1

3.1

Toledo

-7.8

-11.6

-0.8

+0.7

+30.2

2.5

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2000 Census of Population & Housing; 2005-2007 American Community
Survey

1.2 The Political Debate
In examining RPTA, the essential question for cities considering the program is
whether policy implementation changes housing investment patterns within specific
geographic areas. From the city’s perspective, the overall goal of the policy is to increase
housing supply through increased private development, and increase demand for housing
by attracting non-residents from outside the city. It has been argued that RPTA makes
new housing construction affordable and provides “new product jumpers” an incentive to
put urban neighborhoods on their list of housing options (D. S. Sharkey, personal
communication, November 17, 2006).
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Popular arguments supporting the use of RPTA hinge on a counter-factual
scenario: if there were no abatements, there would be significantly less demand for
housing in urban neighborhoods (e.g., Bier, et al., 2007). It has been argued (e.g.,
Rosentraub, 2003) that RPTA can be offset by the increased revenue from other taxes a
city can collect from its new residents who, presumably, earn a higher-than-average
income. For example, the City of Cleveland operating budget for 2007 lists income taxes
as 55.3 percent of general fund revenues, sales, fines and other taxes as 14 percent, and
property taxes as constituting 10.5 percent (City of Cleveland, 2008). Bier et al., (2007)
found a modest increase in income tax gain for Cleveland of $509,044 per year.
Proponents also argue that, not only is the city receiving greater property tax revenues
from land taxes, but the formerly under-utilized land is now occupied by owners who
earn (on average) higher incomes, and who could possibly contribute to a city’s revenue
base through payment of other taxes. There are also costs to cities to maintain abandoned
properties or vacant land such as maintenance (lawn mowing) and public safety. Other
possible positive benefits of RPTA are that it helps remove blight (the original goal of tax
abatement policy in Ohio), spurs more local economic activity (the current goal of the
policy), and positively impacts nearby non-abated property values (Bier, et al., 2007).
Further, framing RPTA as an effective economic development policy over the long term
allows proponents to argue that the abatements will eventually expire resulting in
substantial and new property taxes filling city coffers. Finally, while it can be argued that
RPTA creates a gap at the neighborhood level between the original lower-income
households and the new generally higher-income households in abated homes, conversely
it can be argued that, on a regional level RPTA may help improve the mix of income
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groups in a city and reduce the disparity in median income levels between central city
and suburban households.
Opponents of RPTA describe such policy incentives as nothing more than
“bribes” for potential homeowners to choose one community over another, resulting in
foregone property tax revenues for the community offering the incentive. Abatements
have been described as “involuntary subsidies” (Dardia, 1998) given by overlapping
jurisdictions (e.g., school districts, counties) who have little or no control over RPTA
policies. Hoxby argues that tax burdens are not an indicator of competitiveness, but
rather an attempt to compensate for an unobserved difference in more fundamental
characteristics (as cited in Bradbury & Kodrzycki, 1997).
Opponents can also argue that RPTA may result in tax inequity because properties
of similar values are not being equally taxed, placing a heavier burden on poorer and
more immobile city homeowners. In essence the owners of non-abated property may be
paying higher taxes to maintain public service provisions in order to compensate for
those not paying the property tax. The counter argument is that non-abated homes
increase in value due to the improved demand for property as more people are attracted to
a city by incentives such as RPTA. Opponents further argue that the abated taxes are
merely capitalized into the sales prices (or rent) of homes; therefore, purchasers end up
paying an amount equal to the abated taxes to the home seller or developer (Bartimole,
2007). For aging, declining areas in a region tax abatements offered by one community
may in effect force neighboring communities to offer similar or better tax incentives,
resulting in a negative-sum game as these jurisdictions draw from the same limited
regional pool of “desirable” (middle class, higher earning) residents.
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Across the longer term these residents may eventually leave the community for
one that has a more desirable package of public goods and services, regardless of the tax
incentive, because of homeowners’ changing preferences. If the out-migration of
desirable homeowners results in filtering, the desirable homeowners will be replaced with
a less wealthy group of homeowners. Thus, the reliance on alternative taxes to enhance a
city’s revenues may no longer support the alternative-to-property-taxes argument made
by some proponents of RPTA. Another major argument against RPTA programs is that
they cripple urban city school districts. The current funding structure of public school
districts in Ohio is such that districts rely heavily on property tax revenues, which is not
the case in other states1. Finally, a legal argument against RPTA could be made in that,
although the policy appears prima facie neutral, it has a disparate impact on minorities
who are significantly less likely to be able to afford new homes, even if those homes are
tax abated.

1.3 Statement of the Research Question
Adapting the work of Galster, Walker, Hayes and Johnson (2004) and Galster,
Hayes and Johnson (2005), a fundamental research question regarding the effectiveness
of public policy at the neighborhood level is addressed. The main research question is
whether there is a statistical relationship between residential property tax abatement
(RPTA) and changes in urban neighborhoods as measured on a set of indicators.

1

However, changes in the current school funding structure (rather than a moratorium on RPTA programs)
may be the preferred solution to the plight of urban schools in Ohio. Since 1997, the State of Ohio has
been under an order from the Ohio Supreme Court to create a more equitable public school district funding
structure, including a decrease in the reliance on property tax revenues. See Case No. 1999-0570, DeRolph
v. State, and subsequent court action for more details. The complex relationship between school district
funding and property tax allocation is beyond the scope of this study.
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Subsequent questions are investigated, namely, if there are such relationships, in what
direction are these associations? Is there a certain number of new RPTA homes needed
in a neighborhood before significant relationships are revealed? Finally, if there were no
RPTA in neighborhoods would the relationships remain the same, maintain a significant
level of association, and/or be in the same direction?

1.4 Objectives & Significance
An objective of this study is to uncover significant relationships between RPTA and
stated policy outcomes such as increased private investment, removal of blight, and
reduction in crime. Although equitable distribution of property tax burden is not an
outcome stated in the legislature, it is a popular argument made against the effectiveness
of RPTA and therefore worthy of investigation.
This study makes a new and important contribution to the literature in its evaluation
of RPTA policy (and, by extension, other local economic development policies involving
incentives) in several ways. First, this study expands upon the established work of other
experts in the field of urban studies, thus building on our collective knowledge of policy
evaluation at the neighborhood level. This is accomplished by testing the usefulness of a
published model used to measure the impact of another public policy at the neighborhood
level. Second, this study includes a measure for equity in its evaluation of a public
policy. Including measures for private and public activities, as well as a measure for
equity appears to be somewhat unique in that policy evaluations generally pick one type
of indicator only. Third, previous studies of RPTA have been mostly descriptive in the
analysis (e.g., Bier, et al., 2007; Dalehite, et al., 2005) and/or are from a purely economic
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perspective (e.g., Simons & Sharkey, 1997). This study is a causally-probative (Shadish,
Cook, and Campbell, 2002) analysis in order to uncover the impact of RPTA on certain
neighborhood characteristics, which serve as proxies for more complex dimensions of
neighborhood activity (Galster, et al., 2005). Bier, et al. (2007) comment that the ideal
research design would be to compare a set of outcomes between subject cities with RPTA
and cities without such a program. They argued that appropriate statistical controls and
methodological limitations required reliance on an in-depth case study approach. This
study takes a different tact and, rather than attempting a city-to-city comparison, it
compares a set of outcomes between neighborhoods with tax-abated homes and those
without such homes in an attempt to measure impact at the community level versus the
more common approach of examining outcomes at the parcel level. Finally, the analysis
uses data that are collected annually, thus providing a more accurate reflection of current
activity in urban neighborhoods.
The administration of the same public policy (and its effects) can vary widely
across jurisdictions. In the case of RPTA, states grant different authority to local
governments regarding their ability to offer abatements. Some states grant localities the
authority to abate all property taxes—county and school—on new investments in their
jurisdiction. Other states allow each overlapping government to grant abatements of only
its own taxes on new investments (Beck, 1993). The study sample is drawn from the
population of Ohio municipalities because the abatement policy is a state-derived policy
and operates at the state level. The study can be replicated to examine the impact of
RPTA policy in other areas or to examine other public policies.
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1.5 Definition of Terms
Constructs such as “effective” and “equity” need to be clearly defined in order for
an empirical analysis incorporating such constructs to have any useful meaning. The
following section provides definitions for terms and constructs used in this analysis.
Please note that the definitions provided are not necessarily the only way in which one
could frame these constructs.

1.5.1 Residential Property Tax Abatement
Residential property tax abatement (RPTA) is defined as an exemption from
taxation for real property granted by municipal, township, or county governments as an
incentive for development (Ohio Department of Taxation, 2006), specifically under the
Ohio Community Reinvestment Area program. The International Association of
Assessing Officers (IAAO) define abatement as
(1) an official reduction or elimination of one's assessed valuation after
completion of the original assessment; (2) An official reduction or elimination of
one's tax liability after completion of the assessment roll. (2004, p. 25)
Carter and Hildreth define real property as land and improvements (as cited in Rabin,
1992), assessed at 35 percent in Ohio (Ohio Department of Taxation, 2006). The
abatement offered under RPTA in Ohio’s large cities, however, do not include the land,
but apply only to the improvements (in this case, new residential construction). The
particulars of local RPTA policy vary for new construction in Ohio. Table 2 provides a
summary of the RPTA policy parameters current for the four cities in this study. Each
city may have designated Community Reinvestment Areas prior to the date listed, and
may have scattered properties receiving tax abatement prior to the date as well. The date
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listed in Table 2 identifies when the respective city standardized and codified its RPTA
program. As reflected in Table 1, Columbus is unique among Ohio cities because of its
ability to annex outlining areas resulting in population changes different to the other
cities in the study. Similarly, Table 2 shows that Columbus officials did not see the need
for offering residential tax incentives until 2001, when apparently some of the oldest
areas of the city were showing substantial levels of disinvestment. Further, Columbus
and Dayton confine their respective RPTA programs to small geographic areas.

Table 2
Comparison of Residential Tax Abatement Program Characteristics by City for OneThree Family New Construction
Cleveland

Columbus

Dayton

Toledo

Beginning Date of
Neighborhood
Program

1991

2001

1993

1981

Rate (% of
Improved Value)

100%

100%

100%
(graduated
for 2 CRAs)

100%

Duration

15 years

15 years

9-10 years

15 years

Clawbacks/penalties
for non-compliance

Rescind
abatement w/o
reinstatement

Rescind
abatement

Rescind
abatement

None

Community
Reinvestment Area

Whole City

Neighborhood
Investment
Districts

Specific
CRAs,
w/emphasis
on historic
districts

CRAs
comprising
majority of
city

It can be argued that exemption rather than abatement is the appropriate term to
use in drafting such policies because the locality is choosing not to collect taxes on the
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increased value of the property, the value of which was non-existent prior to the
exemption. In essence, one cannot abate (i.e., put an end to) something one never had in
the first place. Since Black’s Law Dictionary (2004) defines abatement as “the act of
lessening or moderating; diminution in amount or degree”, this definition is appropriately
applied in this instance because governments collect taxes on real property, regardless of
the value of the property. RPTA is merely a diminution in the amount of what otherwise
would be collected. Further, if the results from this study support a counter-factual
scenario i.e., that these neighborhoods would have followed the same trajectories if there
had been no residential tax abatement policy implemented, then the respective taxing
jurisdictions would experience a loss of property tax revenues because of RPTA.

1.5.2 Effective
When describing public policy as effective, one way to measure it is to determine
whether the goals were reached and stated objectives met. The stated goal of CRA policy
in Ohio is:
To promote the revitalization of areas where investment has been
discouraged…The law is used for historic preservation, residential rehabilitation,
industrial remodeling and expansion, and new commercial, residential and
industrial construction. (Ohio Department of Taxation, 1998, p. 6)
RPTA will be described as effective policy if there is a significant increase in
investment, a decrease in crime, and no significant differences in the distribution of the
property tax burden in neighborhoods with RPTA versus city neighborhoods without the
program. One could make a determination that RPTA was effective if the above
legislative goal has been met, in essence, if there was a significant increase in private
sector investment. However, this dissertation expands beyond that economic objective to
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include measurements addressing blight removal, public safety and tax equity, concepts
that are mentioned as objectives in some of the local ordinances regarding RPTA. If
there are no significantly different relationships between the indicators of neighborhood
change for the subject and comparison neighborhoods, then the effectiveness of RPTA as
an economic or community development tool is brought into question.

1.5.3 Equity
Notions of redistribution and equality are often components in definitions of
equity as it relates to public policy. These notions are value-laden terms that can be
interpreted differently by different people (Been, 1992). For example, some ways to
frame a discussion of redistribution can be in terms of wealth, income, tax burden,
administrative cost, or public goods and services. Krumholz and Clavel define social
equity as, “The conscious attempt [by public officials] to devise redistributive policies in
favor of the least powerful and to enhance the avenues of participation” (1994, p. 1).
Cleveland Mayor Frank Jackson frames the concept not as a political one but as the need
for equitable representation in the way our American society and economy are structured
(Zaun, 2007). While public choice models of local expenditures do not explicitly include
redistribution, such approaches may be considered equitable if one assumes that the
federal government fulfills a redistributive role (Blair & Kumar, 1997; Helms, 1985;
others). In essence, distribution (of tax burden, public services, income) is a public
policy issue more so than an economic market outcome because it is a question of values
(Musgrave & Musgrave, 1989). Similarly, equality can be framed as equal access to the
allocation of public resources, equal distribution of public goods and services, or equal

13

application of the procedural processes of government administration, or all of the above.
Equality can be viewed as a passive approach to fairness; if everyone in a jurisdiction is
offered the same opportunity to access public resources, then the system could be viewed
as fair.
In this study, equity refers to vertical equity in property taxation, which occurs
“when the assessment ratio—the ratio of assessed value to market value—is uniform
across property value ranges”, (Cornia & Slade, 2005, p. 19). The International
Association of Assessing Officers (IAAO) defines equity in assessment as, “the degree to
which assessments bear a consistent relationship to market value…(2) In popular usage, a
synonym for tax fairness” (2004, p. 26).
Systematic vertical inequity occurs when lower-value properties are consistently
assessed at a greater portion of their market value, creating what may be referred to as an
“arbitrary and capricious” tax system, with those least able to afford it paying a greater
proportion of their income for property taxes. One hypothesis for the existence of such
inequity is that, in order to offset the loss in revenues from the higher-valued tax-abated
homes, the lower-valued non-abated homes in the neighborhood may be systematically
assessed at a greater proportion of their market value (e.g., Bartimole, 2007). This study
examines vertical tax equity to uncover the presence of any unfair property tax burden in
neighborhoods with tax-abated homes relative to those without abatement. If median
assessment-to-sales ratios between the subject and comparison neighborhoods are
significantly different from each other, then there exists the possibility of systematic
vertical inequity across the combined neighborhoods (Birch, Sunderman & Smith, 2004),
and a need for further research to determine the extent of the inequity.

14

1.5.4 Neighborhood
Galster (2001) describes neighborhoods as bundles of spatially-based
characteristics including those that are structural, infrastructural, demographic, socioeconomic, environmental, political, social-interactive and sentimental, where what is
produced is consumed by the same actors, namely households, property owners, business
people and local government. Where one neighborhood stops and another begins is where
the bundle of attribute changes. Galster (1986) discusses Suttles' four levels of
neighborhood: block face (where children are allowed to play w/o supervision;
"defended neighborhood" (the smallest area possessing a corporate identity as defined by
mutual opposition to another area); "community of limited liability" (administrative
district in which individuals' social participation was selective and voluntary). When
people have been asked to draw their neighborhood, there is no common answer given,
nor is one of the levels of neighborhood dominant: "Actual urban spaces thus may be
arrayed within a matrix according to their scores on these dimensions, analogous to a
social area analysis" (p. 258). Sawicki & Flynn (1996) argue that examining indicators at
the neighborhood level is the best way to check for success/failure of public policy at the
local level because local economic development policies, such as RPTA, operate on a
city subarea (CRAs).
In the academic literature, there are several possibilities for defining
neighborhoods for analysis such as predetermined radii around elementary schools,
administrative boundaries as determined by government, housing submarkets (e.g., Bates,
2006), and other interesting ways to conceive of them (e.g., “collective consumption
units”, Ostrom, 2005, p. 2). Sawicki and Flynn (1996) sum it up well when they write:
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More recently, Galster (1986) showed that, depending on the context, even a
single resident could describe different boundaries for a neighborhood according
to the subject being explored. User-defined areas, institutional definitions, etc.
make it so that there is not one overarching definition. (p. 167)
A common approach in the literature (Chow & Coulton, 1998), and the one taken by
Galster, et al. (2004; 2005), is to delineate neighborhoods by Census tract. Some of the
data sets used in this study are available at the tract level (e.g., HMDA), while the other
data at parcel or address level will be assigned appropriate census tracts.
This dissertation will examine the relationship of RPTA to urban neighborhoods.
Census tracts will act as proxies for neighborhoods, and urban neighborhoods are defined
as those Census tracts that fall within the political boundaries of the following Ohio
cities: Cleveland, Columbus, Dayton and Toledo. While use of proxies is not the ideal
choice, Gephart (in Brooks-Gunn, Duncan & Aber, 1997) comments,
although administrative units, such as census tract and block groups, are imperfect
proxies for the concept of local community, they generally possess more
ecological integrity than cities or SMSAs, and they are more closely linked to the
causal processes assumed to underlie the outcomes of interest. (p. 10)
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction
The literature review guiding this study included work from several different
academic disciplines, as well as from government legislation. This dissertation examines
the relationships between RPTA legislation and changes in the urban neighborhoods of
four Ohio cities. The review begins with an analysis of the relevant state legislation
(2.2), followed by a discussion of municipal policies and local legislation (2.3) pertaining
to residential property tax abatement (RPTA) for the four cities included in this study.
Since RPTA is a tax incentive policy, an analysis of relevant academic literature
regarding the use and effectiveness of tax incentives (2.4) is necessary. The final section
includes a review of theoretical issues (2.5) that are relevant to this study also drawn from
the academic literature and instrumental in the development of the conceptual model, and
is organized under five themes. It is argued that the implementation of RPTA can have
serious implications for both inter-jurisdictional competition (2.5.1) and property tax
equity (2.5.2), and that theories of neighborhood change (2.5.3), the theory of broken
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windows (2.5.4), and the anti-urban—pro-rural dichotomy (2.5.5) have helped lay the
theoretical grounding for the development of policies such as RPTA.

2.2 State Legislative History
In 1969, to help stem the flow of population and investment from the state’s urban
areas, the Ohio’s General Assembly enacted sections 3735.65 and 3735.72 of the Ohio
Revised Code (ORC), which created “rehabilitation areas” wherein remodeled and/or
newly constructed homes were exempt from property taxes. Rehabilitation areas
originally were defined as,
areas within a municipal corporation or unincorporated area of a county for which
the legislative authority…has adopted a resolution…describing boundaries of the
area and containing a statement of finding that the area…is one in which the
conditions of slum housing, blight, or disrepair of housing is such that property
values are depressed, new housing construction and repair and rehabilitation of
existing housing are discouraged because of such depression of values, or because
the incomes of residents generally in the area are such that taxes on property
substantially affect the ability of residents or owners of housing for…repair or
rehabilitation of housing. (§ 3735.65 (B)).
The legislation limited RPTA to ten years and required that cities appoint a housing
officer (§3735.66), a housing committee comprised of property owners in the
rehabilitation area charged with making quarterly inspections of area properties
(§3735.70), and a housing rehabilitation council comprised of political appointees whose
duty it was to conduct annual property inspections in the designated areas (§3735.71).
In 1977, the General Assembly created the Ohio Community Reinvestment Area
(CRA) Program, which repealed the term “rehabilitation areas” and replaced it with
“community reinvestment areas”. This change was not merely one of semantics; by
changing the terminology, the legislature loosened the requirements for an area to qualify
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for tax abatement. Specifically, the conditions of slum housing, blight, disrepair,
depressed property values and income issues of residents were removed, leaving only
two requirements for an area to qualify as a CRA: the existence of structures with
0historical significance, and the discouragement (meaning a dearth) of new housing
construction and repair (§ 3735.65 (B)). The decision of what denotes “historical
significance” was left to local governments with some constraints regarding age,
architectural quality, rarity, and previous designation (§3735.65(D)).
The 1977 CRA program set a maximum allowable tax abatement period of fifteen
years for new construction (§3735.67 (C)). In addition to the CRA program, Chapter
1728 of the ORC contains a tax abatement program for “blighted areas” in “impacted”
cities, but requires the establishment of community urban redevelopment corporations “to
acquire, construct, operate, and maintain a [redevelopment] project” (§1728.01(B)). It is
more difficult to have areas qualify as “blighted” or for a municipal corporation to be an
“impacted city” than it is to establish a CRA. However, a specific examination of the
relationship between community development corporations and RPTA is beyond the
scope of this study.
In 1990, another major change to the law was passed with the insertion of
language requiring local legislative bodies or the housing officer to notify affected school
districts of the proposed tax exemption. Prior to this stipulation, local legislative
authorities were not required to include affected school districts in decisions to grant tax
abatements. Local school districts can be adversely impacted by the loss of property tax
revenues. Municipalities can circumvent the need for approval by affected school
districts waiving their rights to be notified of proposed RPTA offerings (see §
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3735.67(C)). In essence, the level of involvement by the school district depends on the
political strength of the respective school board (M. Sutherland, personal communication,
April 21, 2009).
In 1992 the General Assembly added language that increased local government
accountability in that it required an annual “status report” for each CRA to be submitted
to the Ohio director of development (§ 3735.69 (B)). The Ohio Department of
Development (ODD) acts in an advisory capacity through reviews of proposed legislation
(recommending broad parameters), recommendations on how to limit administrative
dollars to administer the program, and recounts of what has occurred elsewhere around
the state. The ODD also has a regulatory role of investigating complaints, helping cities
with compliance, and decertifying CRAs if necessary (M. Sutherland, personal
communication, April 21, 2009).
When Senate Bill 19 was enacted in 1994, a series of major changes passed
through the Ohio General Assembly regarding CRAs and the corresponding tax
abatement incentives, resulting in a different CRA program. Most of these changes
applied to commercial and industrial projects (such as adding a clawback provision under
§3735.68) more so than to RPTA and does not impact this study. One significant change
for RPTA was that, before 1994 it was stipulated in the Ohio Revised Code that real
property must be exempted 100 percent. Since 1994, more discretion is given to local
legislative authorities in that real property is now exempted up to 100 percent. However,
less discretion was granted to local legislative authorities in that all CRA commercial or
industrial projects created after 1994 must receive approval from the ODD director prior
to granting a real property tax incentive (§3735.671). In essence, these changes resulted
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in two types of CRAs operating in the State: those areas designated as such prior to 1994
and those areas created after the 1994 revisions.
Residential property tax abatement is designed to attract homeowners to purchase
homes in the community offering RPTA. The original objectives outlined in the
authorizing legislation were to combat blight and encourage residential development
where it has been declining. It can be inferred, even if not explicitly stated, that another
objective of the program was to attract desirable (i.e., from a higher socio-economic
group) homebuyers to settle in specific geographic areas. State legislators were operating
under the assumption that Ohio’s urban neighborhoods no longer held any attraction;
developers would no longer build in the city and homeowners would no longer buy
without the use of incentives. By offering RPTA, cities could become a formidable
housing market competitor for the perceived limited pool of desirable residents. To date,
it appears that no published study has evaluated the impact of Ohio RPTA policy on
urban neighborhoods.

2.3

Municipal Development and Administration of RPTA
Much of the language found in local legislation flows from Chapter 3735 of the

ORC. Local legislative bodies were granted some discretion by the General Assembly in
order to tailor Ohio’s Community Reinvestment Program (CRA) program to the specific
needs of their respective communities. Some common program parameters derived from
the ORC and implemented at the local level are the transference of the abatement to
subsequent property owners and by owners paying property taxes on the value of the
land. All that is required of a municipality if it wants to establish a CRA is that there must
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be at least two structures in the proposed area, one of which is a residence, and to survey
the proposed area for “evidence of disinvestment in the structures located
there…basically, evidence that the structures have not been kept up”, (C. R. Manno, Ohio
Department of Development, n.d.).
Detailed decisions regarding the administration of an RPTA program can vary
from locality to locality in terms of the number and size of CRAs, the rate and duration of
abatements, penalties for non-compliance and sunset provisions (language that allows for
the law to “expire” after a certain time if no further legislative action is taken), as well as
requirements concerning historic preservation and green building. Abatements have
come to be viewed as legislative entitlements, so to allow a local RPTA ordinance to
sunset or to decrease the current incentives can pose quite a political problem for local
officials.
Table 3 provides an overview of some projected economic characteristics of the
cities included in this study (U.S. Census Bureau, 2005). Also included is a number
representing the dissimilarity index for each city. The role of racial segregation in
housing can have a significant impact on declining urban areas as well as the current
housing foreclosure crisis. The dissimilarity index represents the percentage of white
people that would need to move to another neighborhood in order to make blacks and
whites evenly distributed across all neighborhoods (Censuscope.org, n.d).
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Table 3
2005 Estimates of Select Economic Characteristics of Four Cities in Study
Cleveland

Columbus

Dayton

Toledo

312,237

565,708

115,219

224,599

Percent of unemployed (civil labor force)

16.3

7.8

13.3

12.5

Median household income (inflationadjusted to 2007 dollars)
Percent of households on food stamps in
last 12 months
Percent of families below poverty level
Index of Dissimilarity

$27,007

$42,031

$28,381

$34,839

23.2

11.2

18.8

16.9

25.2
79.4

14.6
61.0

24.3
78.3

18.0
67.0

Population

One interesting question to examine is how strong a political influence is wielded
by residential property developers and how this influence may impact local RPTA
legislation. Table 4 provides a brief overview of some municipal spending trends for
construction under neighborhood/community development initiatives. To be sure, local
developers have a vested interest in encouraging the adoption of programs and their
enhancement. In Cleveland, for example, local developers encouraged the city to
maintain the program and when the mayor voiced concern with the program’s effects and
the scale of the abatements, businesses leaders lobbied to have an evaluation performed
and to have future decisions about the program based on the evaluation’s analysis and
recommendations (Mikelbank, Rosentraub & Post, 2009). While studies of the politics in
the others cities were not found, it is reasonable to suggest that the outcomes and actions
of developers in Cleveland mirrored the sentiments and positions of builders in other
parts of the state.
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Table 4
Construction Costs as a Percentage of Total (Capital) Expenditures for
Neighborhood/Community Development
Housing
construction
costs
Cleveland

Columbus capital
budget,
neighborhood
services

Capital
improvement
contracts
Dayton

Construction
contracts
Toledo

2003

22.1

---

4.4

45

2004

22.1

---

56.0

38

2005

23.0

0

3.6

54

2006

23.2

0

---

58

2007

36.4

0.17

18.6

0

Budget
Year

2.3.1 Cleveland
The first RPTA ordinance for Cleveland (Ord. No. 2831-86, 1987) established a
Downtown CRA, the goal of which is paraphrased from the ORC: Cleveland CRAs can
be established where there are structures of historical significance and where construction
and repair has been discouraged. Cleveland City Council maintained language from the
original state legislation regarding the removal of blight and preventing its reoccurrence.
Abatements were granted for seven years for new residential units, “with the rate of
exemption set at the increase in market value of the property” (§3). In 1991 local
legislation established all of Cleveland as a CRA, excluding the already established
Downtown CRA, with a fifteen-year abatement at 100 percent for new construction or
conversion of large residential developments of more than twenty-five one- and twofamily homes (Ord. No. 1776-A-90). Residential projects constructing less than twenty24

five single or two-family homes would receive 100 percent abatement for ten years. In
1994 there were changes made to the Downtown CRA that increased the duration to
fifteen years, at 75 percent of market value (Ord. No. 1171-94). In 1999, the geographic
area of the Downtown CRA was expanded (Ord. No. 959-99) and the tax abatement on
new one- and two-family residential construction, regardless of the size of the project,
was increased to fifteen years in City neighborhoods (Ord. No. 960-99).
In 2007, when Cleveland’s RPTA policy was scheduled to end, the policy was
renewed again for the maximum allowable duration and rate for new construction (fifteen
years at 100 percent). What changed in renewing the program is that the former
Downtown-area CRA is now considered a neighborhood, which in essence makes all of
Cleveland one large CRA with the maximum rate and duration allowed for RPTA. In
addition, Cleveland City Council approved future requirements for new construction to
meet Energy Star standards (Samsa, 2007; The City Record, 2007).

2.3.2 Columbus
CRAs have been codified in Columbus since 1978, but the current RPTA program
began in 2001 in five specific areas. The language in the local legislation refers to these
areas as CRAs pursuant to Chapter 3765 of the ORC; however, the city refers to these
areas as Neighborhood Investment Areas, or NIDs. The stated goals of the RPTA
program in Columbus are to stabilize these neighborhoods and upgrade housing units to
increase investments in the city (City of Columbus, 2006). According to the former
RPTA program manager for the city, in order for an area to be considered for NID
designation it must be losing population, have declining schools, vacant lots and/or
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boarded up buildings, and there must be something upon which the city officials can
“hang” success (A. Owens, personal communication, June 27, 2008). For example, Area
A (also known as the Linden neighborhood) had the highest reported crime rate in the
city, with a reduction in crime following redevelopment of the area, which included a
new government agency headquarters for the housing authority and a terminal for the
transit authority, (A. Owens, personal communication, June 27, 2008). Columbus
recently renewed CRA designation of the original five areas, and expanded its RPTA
program to include six more areas (City of Columbus, 2009).
In listing the benefits of tax abatement, Columbus identifies public sector entities
as beneficiaries. Language from both the 2006 and 2009 city development department
website contains the language, “the schools will continue to receive the current, existing
property taxes” (City of Columbus, 2006; 2009). Columbus appears to be no different
than the other cities in the study on this point; owners of newly constructed single-family
homes do not make any additional payments to the school district other than the taxes
paid on the land value. Also similar to other cities, if the home has “uncured” code
violations the abatement can be rescinded (R. Parise, personal communication, April 28,
2009).

2.3.3 Dayton
Similar to Columbus, Dayton has the most targeted RPTA program of the four
cities in this study. Dayton suffers from some of the same urban problems as Cleveland
(even though it is a much smaller city) including high foreclosure rates, a sharp decline in
a number of manufacturing concerns leading to high unemployment levels, an aging
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housing stock, and high level racial segregation (between parts of the city and between
the city and the county. “In recent history, little has affected The City more profoundly
than the significant numbers of people and jobs that have moved to the suburbs” (City of
Dayton, 2008, p. 7). Unlike Cleveland, however, lawmakers did not establish the entire
city as a CRA. Dayton appears to be very careful about using RPTA as a redevelopment
tool. Not only are the city’s CRAs small, but also it has seven neighborhoods in which
only renovations or new construction within the historic districts in those neighborhoods
are eligible for tax abatement. By controlling for each city, this study will attempt to
uncover whether Dayton’s prudent use of the CRA program works better on certain
outcomes than other more geographically comprehensive approaches.
Dayton lawmakers give explicit voice to the impacted school districts, although
the districts have not been granted additional powers beyond notification and comment
(Ord. 28718-93, §44, 1993). Dayton is also unique in that the local legislation states that
the duration of RPTA is up to fifteen years for new construction but the specific time
period varies by area. For example, two historic districts (Wright-Dunbar and Madden
Hills) follow a nine-year, graduated scale for the RPTA program, with a 100 percent
exemption for the first five years decreasing by 20 percent in each of the remaining years.
The city’s vision plan highlights one of the common goals of RPTA, which is to “provide
incentives to community-based developers and the private market to build market-rate
housing”, (Citiplan, n.d., p. 10).
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2.3.4 Toledo
The City of Toledo, also paraphrasing from the ORC, has as the stated goal of its
CRA program to promote investment in neighborhoods that have experienced decline
resulting from disinvestment. Toledo Ordinance 170-04 declares that,
there exist areas of the city that are underdeveloped, blighted, deteriorated or
deteriorating, or inappropriately developed and that these areas have arisen from
inadequate public and private investment and reinvestment in housing. (§1201.02,
2004)
Currently Toledo offers 100 percent abatement on improvements for fifteen years on
single-family new construction, but city officials are contemplating lowering the
parameters on new construction and increasing the rate and duration on rehabilitated
properties (J. Morell, personal communication, August 7, 2008), probably in light of
diminished demand for new housing construction. Unlike the other cities in this study,
Toledo does not emphasize residential development in its advertisement of its CRA
program, but rather highlights the advantages for business and industry relocation to the
city (City of Toledo, 2009). Chapter 135.09 of Ordinance 653-02 (2002) established the
Division of Real Estate within the Department of Economic and Community
Development. The City does have a Department of Neighborhoods with a housing
division; however, it is the Division of Real Estate that is responsible for administering
the RPTA program. Toledo has nine distinct CRAs (see Figure A4 in Appendix), which
account for a majority of the city’s geographic area.
Similar to the discussion of how Columbus city officials define success, Toledo’s
leadership capitalized on the construction of new city school buildings by linking them
with large RPTA developments of new single-family construction and calling it the New
School/New Neighborhoods Initiative. In addition, in 2005 city officials created a CRA
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for political reasons more so than for actual area need; it is the one CRA for which the
city’s tax incentive officer receives the most phone calls for people wanting to build new
homes (J. Morell, personal communication, August 7, 2008). This is not a contemporary
or unique occurrence. Indeed, Swanstrom (1985) provided an example of tax abatement
offered in Manhattan to build office towers in the 1970s, which was not needed and not
supported by market conditions (they would have been built anyway).
An underlying tension in the local conception and administration of RPTA
programs is one of balancing public and private sector interests although, as Malpezzi
(2003) surmises, the public-private distinction is more of a spectrum than a distinct
separation. Common underlying goals of the RPTA programs discussed above are to
revive the urban housing market, attract desirable households to reside in the city, and
remove blight. Additional goals may be to preserve historical structures and areas, as
well as promote green building. All of these goals can create tension between what the
city wants on behalf of all its residents, and what developers want in terms of their profit
margins. As Buss & Redburn (1987) describe it:
The misapplication of public subsidies has also to do with the inherent difference
between the incentives/opportunities for private investors and the public
responsibilities that public officials are charged with...nearly all private
entrepreneurs...invest their capital with the expectation that the return on investment
will be commensurate with the risk undertaken...the public sector, on the other hand,
has traditionally…invested capital in areas where the financial return is long term,
indirect, and uncertain. (pp. 292-293)
These two perspectives do not have to be in conflict necessarily but are often framed as a
game in which the city ends up losing, either by playing too hard and losing the
development contract/firm location decision, or by being too generous with incentives so
that the benefits to the firm outweigh those to the city (e.g., Blair & Kumar, 1997;
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McGuire, 1991). It appears that no published study has examined RPTA on a set of
outcomes derived from both public and private sectors.

2.4 Incentives as Tax Policy
Public policy is an intentional course of action followed by a governmental entity
and backed by the coercive power of the state for resolving an issue of public concern
manifested by laws, public statements, regulations, or widely accepted and visible
patterns of behavior (Cochran, et al. 1999). In the case of economic development, why
does the public sector need to create policies intended to influence the private market?
These policies are designed to move market-based activities to areas that have been
avoided because of perceived higher costs or risks (Musgrave & Musgrave, 1989).
Economic development policy provides administrators and officials with taxes, services,
and regulations in their competitive bag of tricks. There are three characteristics often
used to describe policies as “good:” transparency (openness of processes, decisions,
outcomes), congruency (conforming to the law), and simplicity (not vague). The way
policies involving tax incentives are administered seems to violate these features. Very
often transparency is lacking in what can be considered “backroom deals” between public
officials and corporate executives regarding the offerings being made. Violation of this
characteristic seems to be less with RPTA and more with commercial/industrial projects.
Congruency, it can be argued, is currently being violated by the City of Lorain in its
attempt to make RPTA retroactive for a particular CRA (Green, 2008; 2009), considering
there is no provision in the state law for retroactive RPTA. Finally, when it comes to
administration of tax abatement policy, it can be argued that simplicity is often violated.
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Tax abatement is a part of the broader category of tax policy, which Peretz (1996) points
out, is inherently more complex than other policies. Giertz, McGuire, Nowlan (1996)
define simplicity of tax policy as easy compliance for the taxpayer and easy
administration for the collection agency. Issues such as the fairness of property
assessment and distributional concerns regarding tax burden are but two examples of how
complicated tax policy can be. As Musgrave and Musgrave (1989) contend, “An
equitable tax system cannot be simple...Tax policy is an art no less than a science; and
equity is to be sought as a matter of degree rather than as an absolute norm" (p. 228).
As briefly outlined in Chapter I, the use of tax abatement (and incentives in
general) by the public sector to lure businesses and residents back to the city is not
without controversy. Historically, according to Swanstrom (1985), tax abatement can be
viewed as the successor to urban renewal projects from the 1950s and 1960s, but with
two important distinctions. First, the federal government subsidized two-thirds of urban
renewal projects compared to contemporary administration of local incentives where,
Swanstrom claims, the subsidy is borne by local taxpayers. Second, communities and
developers used to have to follow a federally approved plan; he argues that there is little
public control over tax abatement plans by developers. Jacobs (1961) was extremely
critical of urban renewal policies, which she believed destroyed communities and created
isolated, unnatural urban spaces. If Swanstrom’s criticism of tax abatement policy is
valid, then residential property tax abatement (RPTA) may not bode well for Ohio’s
urban neighborhoods and may place an unfair burden on residents who do not live in taxabated homes.
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The economic development literature has devoted substantial attention to the
impacts of tax incentives for business and industry. Far less work has focused on the
effects of residential tax incentives. This section reviews the literature on the role and
impact of public sector incentive programs offered to both firms and homeowners.
Krumholz (1991) defines local economic development activity as "a process by which
local governments manage resources to stimulate private investment opportunities in
order to generate new jobs and taxes" (p. 292). Rasmussen, Bendick and Ledebur (1984)
define economic development incentives as giving "…public money to private
enterprises in order to encourage these enterprises to alter their operating decisions in
some socially desirable way" (p. 24). In essence, cities give up some revenue today for
the promise of higher revenues in the future (Malpezzi, 2003). After years of incentive
packages being administered, local governments have come under pressure to provide
quantifiable evidence that the policy goal is being reached, namely, that this tool has
increased private investment (Smith, 2006).
Many evaluations conducted in the 1980s and 1990s illustrated the possibility of
negative effects of using incentives in the production of zero-sum gains (e.g., Blair &
Kumar, 1997; Ladd, 1998), prisoner’s dilemmas (e.g., Morse & Farmer, 1986; Anderson
& Wassmer, 1995), and unhealthy inter-jurisdictional competition, (e.g., McGuire, 1991;
Ladd, 1998). In Detroit, communities wanted to avoid being perceived as "non-friendly"
to business, and it appears that firms used the incentives offered by one community to
strong-arm another community into providing a better incentive package, less they lose
the possibility of the firm locating in their community (Anderson & Wassmer, 1995).
Bingham and Bowen (1994) evaluated the impact of economic development program
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funding on state economic vitality and found no significant relationship. Bartik (1991)
examined economic development and asked the question of who benefits. In terms of job
growth policies, he concluded that unemployed residents get jobs in the short run, which
can positively impact their long-run prospects, and that any net benefits from these
policies are most likely to be positive in the worst areas. However, in terms of net
benefits for tax abatement policies, Bartik reached a different conclusion stating that if
land value increases are the only benefits from these policies, then the problems of the
poor and disadvantaged are not being addressed. This conclusion is relevant because of
the disproportionate number of lower-income households that live within urban
neighborhoods. Sawicki & Flynn (1996) argue that,
Public policy often aims at moving individuals in order to generate improvements
in geographically-based indicators. For example, the de facto goal of a city policy
often seems to be to displace poorer households with richer ones, thus raising the
socioeconomic standards of the area. The action may make the city more solvent
fiscally, but the result is not necessarily an improvement in the lives of some
residents. (p. 15)
Positive effects from incentives are found in Wong’s (2002) study of the use of incentives
in England. He concluded that, “the 'welcome mat' effect of financial incentives,
relocation packages and other activities of local development agencies is critical to attract
foreign inward investment," (p. 1843).
Sands, Reese and Khan (2006) note that incentives have been reported to be
effective as well as ineffective in the literature because of differing research
methodologies, variation in the operationalization of "effectiveness", differing units of
analysis (individual, local, county, region, state), and differing time periods. Their
general conclusion is that the more effective abatement programs seem to be local
initiatives that are geographically targeted and evaluated periodically. The authors
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include a discussion of best practices, or what local governments should consider before
granting tax abatements. Their recommendations include focusing on particular areas,
ensuring the proposed incentive is compatible with the local population, and including
claw backs or some recourse in the event that the private sector does not deliver on what
was promised to the city (also Ledebur & Woodward, 2003).
Krumholz (1991) argues that hard bargaining rather than making offerings of
inducements would be a better move for municipalities; in essence, "cities should
negotiate as equals" (p. 292). Professor Krumholz believes inducements should be
carefully programmed and development should be balanced between "weaker"
(neighborhoods) and "stronger" areas (downtown), although downtowns often become
the focus of development. Rasmussen, Bendick and Ledebur (1984) recommended that
enticements to businesses to influence their location decisions should come from the
federal government: "...state and local government may be well suited to administer, but
not finance, many forms of firm-specific economic development incentives” (p. 24).
Morse and Farmer (1986) also examine effectiveness of tax abatements for
business in a sample of Ohio's CRAs (n=24) and conclude that tax abatements for
businesses only work if the state aid formula to these areas is adjusted to reflect the loss
of public revenue from the abatement. Based on their conclusion, one has to ask whether
any incentive policy is effective considering that the state would have to continue to
provide additional subsidy designated areas. Dalehite, Mikesell and Zorn (2005) provide
a comprehensive overview of state abatement programs, and recommend that tax
abatement be used for select parcels, have a time limit on the reduction (also Courant,
1994), and that it is the only incentive offered (i.e., it cannot be used in conjunction with
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other incentive programs). Their main conclusion is that abatement programs tend to be
overly generous and, similar to others (e.g., Sands, Reese & Khan, 2006), conclude that
targeting blighted areas may be the only way to guarantee positive net benefits for the
city.
Similar to the incentives discussed previously, a goal of RPTA is to increase
residential investment where disinvestment has occurred. Is there anything inherent in
the CRA legislation that guarantees RPTA (or incentives for firms) will spawn growth in
an area? As Coffin (1982) points out, "there is in principle no mechanism in the tax
reduction itself which would be expected to increase the long-term growth rate of the
jurisdiction” (p. 18). Krumholz (1991) argues that there is little support that incentives
(“subsidies”) fulfill the public purpose of neighborhood revitalization. Jacobs (1961, p.
532) warns that urban areas must be capable of holding their populations "to stay put by
choice over time" and a temporary property tax break may not be enough to support such
a choice.
Additionally, the research performed does not support the notion that tax
incentives alter firm’s inter-regional location decisions, although they may influence the
location decision within the region (e.g., Coffin, 1982; Morse & Farmer, 1986) or
between a few locales (Ledebur & Woodward, 2003). Does this marginal influence hold
true for households? Mark, McGuire and Papke (2000) control for jurisdiction and time
effects in their panel study spanning twenty-five years to examine whether taxes are an
important determinant of economic development in Washington, D.C. In their analysis
of the revealed preferences of buyer behavior, the authors did not find local property
taxes to be a significant factor in residential location choice. Conversely, Bier, et al.
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(2007) found that over a quarter of those surveyed who recently bought a tax-abated
home in Cleveland (n=44) stated that they would not have done so without RPTA, and
over half who were planning to buy a home in the near future (n=101) would not consider
purchasing a new home in Cleveland without RPTA.
Dardia (1998) and Smith (2006) examine redevelopment programs within TIF
districts, and define effectiveness as an increase in property values. Tax-increment
financing (TIF) uses incremental tax revenue from a revitalized area to finance the
infrastructure that made the revitalization possible. The authors did not reach similar
conclusions regarding the effectiveness of incentives. Dardia (1998) performed matchedpaired testing, and used property assessment values of 38 projects in California TIF
districts from 1983 to 1996. Each project area was matched to a Census block group
based upon location and two conditions of blight (average vacancy and poverty rates),
and the differences in the growth of assessed values in a project and its matched or paired
area to determine effectiveness. Dardia’s study is particularly interesting because he
determined that the project areas, in order to be considered self-financing (and therefore
effective), needed to grow at a faster rate than the comparison areas since a majority of
the increase in property taxes was reinvested back into the TIFs. He found fewer than 25
percent of the projects came close to being responsible for the property tax revenues they
received; the rest of their funding was government subsidy. Smith (2006) examined the
Chicago multifamily real estate market in order to determine the influence of TIF
designation on the real property appreciation rates. The results indicated that properties
located within a designated TIF district exhibit higher rates of appreciation after the area
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is designated when compared to those properties selling outside TIF districts, or to those
properties that sell within TIF district boundaries prior to designation.
Tax policy seen from an economic perspective highlights the effect of tax policies
on economic growth and on efficient use of resources, while speculating on the potential
distortions results from such policies. Determining if a public policy is economical may
make one ponder the question of for whom is it economical. Do all those impacted from
said policy inherent the same burdens as well as benefits? Much of the emphasis in the
legislation and the empirical research examining tax incentives is from an economic
perspective. For example, Bier, et al. (2007) highlight the additional benefits to
Cleveland resulting from its RPTA such as appreciated land value, earnings tax, and
improved property values of nearby homes. Conversely, Courant (1994) argues that
analyses of tax incentives should include all social costs, including externalities: "What
we should seek to measure in our assessments of local economic development policies is
changes in the level and distribution of economic welfare" (p. 863). Malpezzi (2003)
concludes that distributional considerations have implications for state and local fiscal
conditions, giving the example of a poverty rate one percent higher than average spends
an extra $2.20 per capita on police. Fosler (1991) writes, "the experience of state and
local economic development efforts reflects a series of economic relationships that is
both broader and richer than those captured in conventional economic theory” (p. 250).
Krumholz (1991) advocates for economic development practitioners to emphasize
upgrading education and increasing the employable population rather than focusing on
capital and subsidies. Hissong (2003) argues that cities need to incorporate social and
political forces, and to understand the community "as something in which the economy is
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embedded as part of the overall social relations; markets do not emerge out of a vacuum
but out of the social circumstances that surround them” (paraphrasing Polanyi, p. 133).
Dror (1967) regrets the “invasion” of economics into public decision making. He argues
that critical elements (e.g., future non-economic impact) of policy making get ignored by
viewing it only in economic terms.
Mikesell (1998) and Peters (1996) see tax policy development as primarily
political:
They [taxes] are amounts established through the operations of a political process
in which a structure of laws, not a series of market transactions, determines how
the cost of government will be distributed among elements of the private
economy, (Mikesell, 1998, p. 173).
He observes that the tax system is more than what is written (statues defining tax base
and rates); it involves the administration of that system and how private entities respond
to that administration, the interactions of which are essentially political. Peters (1996)
sees the political process as having its own internal logic that can conflict with other
criteria such as simplicity, fairness/equity, and openness (i.e., transparency). He notes
that government has to figure out how to find ways to pay for the services while escaping
notice of the pursuit of payment. This may be one reason why RPTA is so politically
palatable; there is no pursuit of payment in the short term. Peters also argues that
politicians can rarely use tax policy to their advantage in electoral politics. One could
argue RPTA is an exception. As an owner of an RPTA property, one receives city
services while paying a minimal amount of land taxes in the shorter term, and non-RPTA
property owners are not aware of the potential of an increased tax burden to cover the
costs of RPTA. All tax decisions are political decisions, but tax policies also may be
used as mechanisms for social control (Peters, 1996). "Sin" taxes will hopefully curb
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undesirable behavior, and RPTA will hopefully encourage people to move back to city
neighborhoods.
Some authors argue that there are positive non-economic impacts resulting from
incentives, particularly RPTA, such as pride of homeownership. Abatements can give
some people mortgage ability that they may not otherwise have qualified for (Bier, et al.,
2007). DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999) argue that homeownership may encourage
investment in local amenities and social capital because homeownership gives individuals
an incentive to improve their community and because it creates barriers to mobility.
Using the U.S. General Social Survey, the authors conclude from their analysis that
homeowners invest more in social capital, and that a large portion of the effect of
homeownership on these investments comes from lower mobility rates for homeowners.
Hence, RPTA may encourage the initial home purchase in an urban neighborhood, but
the effect of such a purchase may have an impact beyond the parcel. This positive
outcome may not apply to all income classes, however. Ambrose (1998) asked whether
subsidized loans increase home ownership in low-income neighborhoods. He found
current subsidies to be too low relative to the costs of homeownership, and particularly
less attractive to low-income families. He discussed the risks and costs involved to
homeowners who take on a mortgage and the care of their own home and property.
Although abatement can help some people obtain a mortgage they may not have qualified
for otherwise, the unforeseen costs of homeownership and/or uncontrollable factors (job
loss, illness) may result in home loss. This assertion is sustained by Bier, et al., (2007).
They found that twenty percent of tax-abated homes went into foreclosure.
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There remains no consensus whether tax incentives comprise “good” public
policy. What, then, accounts for the popularity of incentives as policy? As Swanstrom
(1985) mentions and Ledebur and Woodward (2003) observe, incentives “provide
policymakers with one of the few discretionary tools available that could sway private
decisions in the short run", (p. 76). In addition, officials seeking reelection can “hang
success” on securing additional jobs and/or residents for their respective community.
Third, tax incentives can be framed as something that does not cost anything for the
taxpayer; i.e., no public money was spent on the very visible, new-constructed structures.
Rebuilding infrastructure can be presented as something that needed to happen anyway
and that is beneficial to all residents of an area, not just those in RPTA homes.
Graham Allison (1980) argues that there is a constitutional difference between
private sector and public sector administration of policy due to the separation of powers
principle. Private industry is centralized under a chief executive officer, but local public
administrators answer to numerous elected officials and citizens. Business is expected to
operate in its own self-interest (Beckett, 2000) but this behavior can be in conflict with
operating in the public interest. Indeed, there is an assumption about public policy, an
example of which can be found in the legislative language pertaining to RPTA, which is
that it is of a public purpose. Conversely, Kincaid (1991) argues that competition
between public and private interests is inherent part of the American federalist system
and that “it [competition] is not accidental or an undesirable by-product of democracy; it
is a constitutionally protected value”, (p. 97). Ostrom (2005) concurs and sees opening
the public sphere to “entrepreneurship” as key to increasing the quality of public goods.
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Another issue rests with the goal of private enterprise, which can be to maximize
profits or market domination. If the goal of government is to operate like the private
sector and maximize profits then, Beck (1993) argues, government should pursue
discriminatory taxation practices because it will enhance its ability to fulfill this goal.
Bewley (1981) tested the revenue-maximizing hypothesis for government and concluded,
“I find a [Tiebout local expenditures] model with homogenous communities and profitmaximizing governments startling and strikingly in conflict with my everyday
experience" (p. 735). In essence, there are normative democratic values (such as liberty
and equality) that cannot be ignored when pursuing private sector principles in the public
sector.
Another approach to minimizing negative impacts of incentives is to structure the
policy so that costs and benefits are distributed throughout the metropolitan region.
Through zoning restrictions suburbs in metropolitan regions are able to limit the number
of poor people they are willing to allow in their respective communities. Therefore, the
central city has a disproportionate number of poor people for whom to provide services.
Set-asides such as affordable housing units have not redistributed lower-income
households to the degree needed to decrease the burden placed on central cities. Apart
from Corman and Mocan (2005), uncovering relationships between residential tax
incentives and redistribution appears to be missing from the already sparse literature
examining RPTA. It is argued that an equitable stance would be for the region to bear the
collective burden for the costs of the central city providing incentives, with regional tax
sharing offered as a solution (e.g., Orfield, 2003; Reschovsky, 2000), although this
approach comes with its own set of problems not the least of which is securing the
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political will of many local jurisdictions to participate. However, a detailed discussion of
regional tax sharing and its relationship to RPTA policy is beyond the scope of this study.

2.5 Theoretical Issues
If Waldo (1948) is correct, then every public sector decision has a political theory
behind it. The decision to give tax abatements to certain homeowners in certain
designated geographic areas can be grounded in the argument that, not only does RPTA
directly provide a short-term benefit to individual homeowners who buy abated
properties, but also the policy may benefit the greater good in the longer term through
increased property values, spurring other local development, and building social capital
and community cohesion. One of the goals of this dissertation is to test this utilitarian
principle by uncovering relationships between RPTA and overall changes in
neighborhoods. RPTA is a tax policy presented by public officials as an economic
development tool designed to influence potential home buyers’ purchasing decisions and
increase overall investment in previously distressed areas. This section of the literature
review begins with an examination of American property tax policy as it relates to interjurisdictional competition and equity. Ultimately, the discussion over each of these
concepts seems to center around how the argument is framed, either viewing residents as
consumers and neighborhoods as “collective consumption units” (E. Ostrom, 2005, p. 2),
or residents as members of something beyond the economic vernacular and the function
of local governments as more than a service delivery agent. Then, an overview of
theories of neighborhood change is provided, followed by a discussion of the theory of
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broken windows policing. The final theoretical issue in this section examines some
ideological concepts that continue to influence American residential location patterns.

2.5.1 Inter-jurisdictional Competition
This discussion begins with Tiebout’s (1956) theory of local expenditures, which
lays the groundwork for all further discussion in the literature on inter-jurisdictional
competition (IJC). Examining IJC is fundamental to an examination of tax incentives
because our federalist political system is structured in such a way that there are many
local jurisdictions in a given urban area in competition with one another for opportunities
to maintain or increase revenues. In the case of RTPA, property tax revenues may not
increase but revenues should increase from other taxes collected from new residents and
private development who were wooed away from nearby jurisdictions. From the Tiebout
perspective (see also Ostrom, Tiebout, & Warren, 1961; Oates & Schwab, 1991; E.
Ostrom, 2005, and others), property taxes are benefit payments for the services produced
and financed by those taxes. If many local governments compete against one another,
than all local taxes become benefit taxes with an obvious incentive for efficient service
delivery (Oates & Schwab, 1991). Courant (1994) argues that at the local level the
common public services package consists of primarily infrastructure maintenance and
public safety. Therefore, “given that water and sewer are already covered by user
charges, a property tax is not a bad approximation of a user charge [benefit tax]”,
(paraphrasing George Break, p. 877). However, Courant concedes that the use of
property taxes to finance public schools complicates the benefits approach to property
taxes. Kenyon and Kincaid (1991) concluded that the Tiebout model is economically
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efficient in that the optimal mix of public goods at minimal cost is delivered, but that it is
not equitable because there are no excess local taxes available to pay for public goods or
services needed by residents who are unable to pay property taxes. Not all scholars are
in agreement regarding the notion of property taxes as benefit taxes because tax systems
are complex and unclear, and so it is difficult to say how closely a given tax system
mimics benefit taxation (Goodspeed, 1998), and it is difficult to determine who actually
bears the tax burden (Zodrow, 2006).
Viewing the property tax as a benefit tax has possible implications for RPTA
programs, from increasing the property tax burden on nearby un-subsidized property
(negative externality) to having no aspects of redistribution. Property tax capitalization
happens when a change in taxes or public services causes a change in housing price
(Sirmans, Gatzlaff, & Macpherson, 2008). Mandell (2003) considers the possibility that
property taxes are capitalized into housing prices. If so, are taxes on land (not on the
improvements) neutral and therefore better than property taxes? This is an issue that can
be made by proponents of RPTA, namely that the abatement is capitalized into the
housing price resulting in homeowners “getting more house for their money”, with
homeowners only paying taxes on the land. Mandell (2003) concludes that only under
specific and generally unrealistic circumstances does the property tax behave in this way:
"It is hard to establish whether a high tax rate results in low housing values (through
capitalization) or low housing values result in a need for high tax rates", (p. 11). Yinger
(1999) concurs; “except under extreme conditions, the local property tax does distort
housing decisions, regardless of voters' perceptions about capitalization", (p. 322). These
“extreme” conditions are powerful (perfect) zoning laws and (perfect) mobility, which
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describe certain suburbs only and do not apply to large and heterogeneous cities (Ladd,
1998). In essence, even if property taxes were fully capitalized into housing prices, it still
does not establish whether the property tax should be viewed as a user charge on benefits
received (Zodrow, 2006).
Another potential issue with the Tiebout model is the unintended spillover effects
(externalities) that may occur outside of the market. The possibility of externalities
resulting from administration of tax policy is relevant to RPTA in that there may be
spillover effects, positive or negative, impacting the areas in which tax-abated homes are
located. Moreover, does RPTA create externalities that can lead to inefficient location
decisions (Oates & Schwab, 1991)? Reschovsky (2000) notes that some authors have
argued that the Tiebout model does not necessarily generate an efficient allocation of
public goods, with others asserting that the theory may hold but the assumptions upon
which it is based do not.
In the Tiebout model, one assumes that the consumer-resident (referred to as the
consumer-voter in his model) is perfectly mobile, and can move (“vote with their feet”)
to a community that optimizes their preferences for public goods. In this view, local
taxes-services packages are what make communities unique and, therefore, influence the
location decisions of the consumer-resident. Tiebout’s model relies on this exit
mechanism, but there are other approaches offered that do not have to assume perfect
mobility. For instance, Hirschman (1970) discusses a voice mechanism of complaining
to your elected official. As Warner & Hefetz (2002) argue, "…both localism and markets
are equated with voice and freedom, but consumer voice and citizen voice are not the
same" (p. 85). High rates of residential mobility prove detrimental to areas of decreasing
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population and “foster institutional disruption and weakened social controls over
collective life” (Sampson & Raudenbush, 1997, p. 920).
Tiebout's description of consumer-residents may be applicable to a certain
segment of society, namely white middle- and upper-class potential home owners who
would consider moving to urban neighborhoods if it was a good investment. This group
has mobility (or they would not be looking to buy a house), they have choices of
communities (unlikely to experience housing discrimination), and there are incentives
being offered (RPTA) to influence their choices. The survey results in Bier, et al. (2007)
seems to support Tiebout's assumptions somewhat in that those homeowners who took
advantage of Cleveland’s RPTA program were mobile, had an array of choices of
communities, and were aware of the incentives being offered. As a result it could be
argued that Tiebout's theory of local expenditures is a good descriptor for the behavior of
certain groups, but not for others.
It has also been argued that the assumption of mobility, let alone perfect mobility,
is a faulty one. Bartik (1991) argues that households are extremely immobile due in part
to having a “sense of place” as well as the substantial costs associated with moving.
Courant (1994) also counters the assumption of ease of mobility:
First, it is worth noting that the transactions and transition costs associated with
leaving one's current place of residence in response to structural unemployment
may be quite large. Selling one house and buying another uses up perhaps 15
percent of the house value; moving itself may cost thousands of dollars. There are
nontrivial capital losses involved in losing a good deal of location-specific
knowledge that is of both social and economic value. Children who are attached
to their social setting add to these costs. I can easily believe that for many
households, willingness to pay for finding reasonable employment near home,
rather than having to leave the area, could be worth a year's pay or more. (p. 873)
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These two comments move beyond the resident-as-consumer metaphor with the inclusion
of non-economic factors that may influence residential location choices. In answer to the
question of residential mobility, it depends on whose model you use (Mandell, 2003).
Another assumption of Tiebout’s theory is one of perfect information. The
perfectly mobile consumer-resident can vote with their feet because they have all that is
required to make a fully informed choice of which community has the taxes-to-services
ratio they most prefer. One can envision a resident-consumer moving to a community
where the prices (taxes) of community services are set (another assumption) and fully
known, and the resident-consumer knows the exact amount of services she wishes to
purchase. As Tiebout describes it, "If consumer-voters are fully mobile, the appropriate
local governments, whose revenue-expenditure patterns are set, are adopted by the
consumer-voters" (1956, p.424). In essence, administrators need to uncover the residentconsumer's preferences for public goods and services, and then tax her accordingly to pay
for these services. This assumes, of course, that the government will allocate funding
based purely on the preferences of its resident-consumers, without influence from any
other parties or factors. Another fundamental problem with uncovering residentconsumer preferences is that there is no good mechanism by which residents register their
preferences for public goods and services other than the flawed political process of voting
and/or complaining to a representative in the hopes of influencing local revenueexpenditure patterns.
Finally, assuming that the tax-services mix is set seems grounded in the
assumption that communities are static entities. Rosenthal (2008) concluded that
neighborhoods are not static, but that there exists cycles of neighborhood decline and
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renewal. If communities are indeed dynamic one has to question whether is it possible
to ever have the production, allocation, and distribution of public goods and services
aligned with current resident-consumer preferences, or if prospective resident-consumers
ever have full information to make a location choice given this dynamic nature of
communities. Indeed, there is a theoretically optimum community size in Tiebout’s
model defined as "the number of residents for which this bundle of services can be
produced at the lowest average cost" (1956, p. 419). In the case of urban neighborhoods,
which are part of large municipalities, can a city be "too big" to ever accommodate
preferences? How does this issue play out in retaining residents over the longer-term,
say, beyond the years of tax abatement? Moreover, cities are facing higher demands for
public services from poorer and aging residents, with lower revenues with which to
provide these services (Reschovsky, 2000; Ladd & Yinger, 1991). Indeed, "dozens of
studies show that the cost of public services is higher in communities with more
concentrated poverty or disadvantage" (Yinger, 1999, p. 318). From a resident-consumer
perspective, assuming full information, RPTA may not provide enough incentive for
folks to move to urban neighborhoods because the cost for city services is greater than
the benefit received, coupled with payment for services consumed by other,
disadvantaged residents.
The approach taken by Tiebout’s theory is grounded in a stream of economic
thought known as public choice. Public choice advocates find it desirable to place the
majority of governmental action at the lowest possible levels because local governments
would provide more innovation and true competition. The reality is that higher levels of
government weigh in on policy and tax decisions that impact local development patterns,
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which in turn influence individual location decisions. It is assumed that individuals are
rational economic actors driven by competitive self-interest (Terry, 1998) who rank
bundles of public goods and services in the same way they rank private goods. Public
choice theory supports privatized cities that can exclude others (Frug, 2000), and control
revenue (Briffault, 2000). It is also assumed that these individuals have the ability to exit
a community if their chosen local jurisdiction no longer fulfills their preferences, and that
any location choice they make is free from any restriction (i.e., no housing
discrimination). From the public choice perspective, aggregation of all individuals’
choices results in the collective choice of a community. However, Sen (1970) argues that
individual preferences reflect the forces that determine said preferences in a society: "Just
as social choice may be based upon individual preferences, the latter in their turn will
depend on the nature of society" (p. 5).
Frug (1999) rejects the benefit tax models on two points. First, he rejects the
notion that homogeneity promotes efficiency, and that rich and poor want to live apart
because they want different types and levels of city services:
Our fragmented communities should not be viewed as voluntary associations
because of exclusionary zoning, discriminatory practices, etc. Nobody ‘has a
taste for’ bad schools and services. People do so because they feel they have no
other choice. The prosperous suburban high school feels like a private school,
where the ‘exclusive’ quality is maintained through exclusionary zoning rather
than an admissions office (p. 174).
Second, Frug argues it is wrong to assume city services are only objects of consumption,
and call for community leaders to be more than mere goods and services providers. He
argues that, to equate citizenship with consumption is to diminish the notion of
citizenship; choice should not be based merely on exit and consumption. Warner &
Hefetz (2002) believe that citizens create choices that can advance their community.
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Clark (1996) provides a list of flaws in neoclassical economic theory as it applies to real
estate markets: there is no homogeneity of objects traded (each property is unique); there
are relatively few buyers and sellers, both of whom have less than full knowledge; the
markets are highly localized and segmented wherein the supply of land is relatively fixed,
yet demand is volatile.
Kenyon (1997) provides a review of several models of inter-jurisdictional
competition (IJC) including the Tiebout and Oates-Schwab models, McGuire's (1991)
model of destructive competition that assumes individuals have preferences for
redistribution and thus choose revenue systems based upon ability-to-pay taxes, and
Wolkoff's (1985) model of competition of business using economic development
subsidies. Kenyon concludes that IJC is prevalent, should not be squelched, and would
be better if channeled and regulated. Reschovsky (2000) hold a very different view of
IJC, arguing that it exacerbates sprawl and the degradation of metropolitan areas.
Kincaid (1991) warns that, "a wholesale embrace of competitive federalism [i.e.,
IJC] could have its own undesirable consequences” (p. 88). These models of IJC apply to
the current study because RPTA helps create unmediated market competition in that
jurisdictions are in direct competition with each other for a limited pool of desirable
residents moving to a given region. However, unmediated does not equal unregulated
competition; state-level departments of development as well as the judicial system can
fulfill a regulatory role regarding RPTA.
From the perspective that IJC is beneficial, cities are in competition with one
another and need to approach their public policy decisions regarding land use with
competition in mind. Potential homebuyers weigh public goods and services bundles
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offered by communities and choose “that community which best satisfies his [her]
preference pattern for public goods” (Tiebout, 1956, p. 418). Oates (1969) stated that
households actually take public policy into account when choosing a community in which
to live. Netzer (1997) believes that IJC for businesses can result in an externality because
the location of a firm will affect more than just its chosen jurisdiction; unless you have
fiscal zoning (used to attract occupants whose tax contribution is greater than their public
services usage (Podgodzinski, 1993)), all of the advantages of economic growth in a city
do not accrue to the specific municipality in which it occurs. However, Rosentraub
(2003; 2006) points out that the costs, as well as the advantages of such growth can be
distributed beyond the municipality. Additional interesting work has been done
examining the impact of tax abatements and other location incentives on interjurisdictional competition (e.g., Anderson & Wassmer, 1995; Blair & Kumar, 1997;
McGuire, 1991).
McGuire (1991) argues that the Tiebout model of IJC is efficient in production
and allocation of public good and services, but that it is not equitable in its distribution of
resources and residents, leaving some jurisdictions with an unfair advantage. Fair
treatment requires tax burdens reflecting ability to pay regardless of residential location.
This issue may fall away if redistribution is effectively pursued at a higher level of
government. Indeed the conventional economic wisdom (e.g., Ostrom & Schwab, 1991;
Helms, 1985; Ladd, 1998) is that redistribution should remain the purview of federal
government, which in theory would help maintain a more equitable distribution of public
goods and services. McGuire (1991) counters the Tiebout model with her model of
destructive IJC among state governments, where there is strong incentive for
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governments to compete for mobile (and often wealthier) residents and businesses by
cutting taxes and reducing the tax burden, or shifting the burden to the non-mobile and
non-wealthy. She argues that this strategy may result in governments collecting less
revenue and therefore providing a lower level of public goods, or charging higher taxes to
immobile/poorer residents. After a time, the competing jurisdictions are all worse off.
Wolkoff (1985) presents a model of IJC that takes tax abatement into account. He
comments that in practice abatements to firms are almost always granted, and no system
is in place to determine when it should be offered and how generous an offer should be
made. Since RPTA is viewed as a legislative entitlement with relatively uniform
program parameters, there is arguably no “backroom dealings” regarding residential
abatement, unlike abatement agreements with businesses (M. Rosentraub, personal
communication, August 29, 2006). Wolkoff concludes that economic development
administrators seem to overestimate the influence the abatements have on firm
investment decisions, or they pay too little attention to the likelihood that investment will
proceed without the abatement. Similar to Krumholz (1991), Wolkoff recommends that
full abatements not be viewed as an entitlement, but rather given as an award. For
instance, projects that require less from the city (e.g., less infrastructure improvements)
should get a greater abatement. However, it may be impossible to put the abatement
genie back in the bottle now that there are years of precedent for full abatement offerings
as the expected standard. Critics of IJC (e.g., Netzer, 1997) worry about the limiting of
government’s ability to perform redistributive functions and that, “we're trading social
equity for public efficiency” (Kincaid, 1991, p. 88).
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2.5.2

Equity
The definition and conceptualization of equity changes and is a function of

disciplinary norms and normative values. Social equity is a normative approach where
public officials and administrators advocate on behalf of those of lower socioeconomic
status, thus giving a voice to those with less power and ability to influence the public
decision making process. Social equity advocates in public administration and urban
planning (e.g., Frederickson, 1971; Krumholz & Clavel, 1994) often criticize public
policy development as inadequate because, in drafting policy goals and objectives
legislators often fail to ask, “Goals and objectives for whom?” and fail to give
consideration to the most disadvantaged in society. However, answering this question is
complicated and involves social philosophy and value judgments (Musgrave &
Musgrave, 1989). In essence, “revenue policy and expenditure policy reflect the values
of the society” (Ross, Levine, Stedman & Murray, 1991, p. 415). Social equity as a value
can impact all members of a community, not just public decision makers:
The society in which a person lives, the class to which he belongs, the relation
that he has with the social and economic structure of the community, are relevant
to a person's choice not merely because they affect the nature of his personal
interests, but also because they influence his value system including his notion of
‘due’ concern for other members of society (Sen, 1970: 6).
When economic goals are the only stated pursuit of a given public policy, for example,
these can be perceived as antithetical to objectives of equity and to democratic practices
(Hummel, 1994). Income redistribution advocates, such as Bradbury and Kodrzycki
(1997), argue that there is a broader array of issues that must come into consideration
when writing public policy:
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...policymakers have additional goals besides economic development, including
an equitable distribution of income and the evenhanded treatment of different
business activities (p. 2).
This conception of social equity differs from the discussion found in the public
finance literature, wherein equity is equated with redistribution of resources, goods and
services, tax burden, and/or income. Ostrom, Tiebout, & Warren (1961) view equity as
an "equitable distribution of costs and benefits" (n 13, p. 836) in a framework that
considers local taxes to be payment for the benefits received by the one making the
payment. This is referred to as the benefit equity principle (Musgrave & Musgrave,
1989). However, Reschovsky (1991) is critical of this view and argues that looking at
local taxes as benefit taxes cannot adequately consider redistributive policies and
requirements, suggesting that,
there is a great deal of fluidity in the state and local fiscal environment, with
competition pushing some governments toward benefit taxation, while other
governments resist such moves, presumably for reasons of tax equity. (p. 150)
Assuming that equity as redistribution is a legitimate and worthwhile public
policy objective, the question then becomes at what level of government should it be
pursued. A common argument is that redistribution should be pursued only at the federal
level of government. The first reason given is that only the federal purse is large enough
to pursue adequately such policy:
By including the general welfare as a legitimate objective of federal finance, the
Constitution refrains from setting specific limits to the federal government’s
expenditure function. (Musgrave & Musgrave, 1989, p. 25)
Also, the amount of redistribution undertaken at the local level is limited by the potential
in-migration of the poor and out-migration of the rich (Oates, 1972). Epple and Romer
(1991) examined the role of mobility as a constraint on redistribution, with results
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showing a sorting of the poorest households to communities with the most redistribution.
Epple and Platt (1998) discuss a "zone of indifference" for some households, wherein
taxes can increase (to a point) and yet they do not move out of the city. They argue that
using the property tax for redistribution does not have to cause an out-migration of
wealthier households; however, they find that the proportion of wealthier households
relative to the total number of households in a municipality is a decreasing function of
income.
The second reason given is that redistributional efforts at the state or local levels
create competitive disadvantages in attracting and/or maintaining wealthier populations
and firms. The assumption here is that equity is viewed as a disincentive for household
and business location decisions. If the rich live outside the central city, then county-level
or regional approaches (which are still at the local level) could bring about spatial
redistribution (Netzer, 1997). If redistribution is a pure "national public good” so that
non-residents also benefit, then the level of redistribution provided by localities will be
inefficiently low (McGuire, 1997). If, however, preferences for redistributive policies
differ wildly, then it begs the question whether redistribution is a national public good.
In McGuire’s model (1997), she assumes people value redistribution, therefore they
choose revenue systems based upon ability-to-pay taxes. Fox (2001), on the other hand,
argues that people and businesses move to avoid redistribution. Reschovsky (1991)
found that state and local governments do in fact have redistributive social programs, and
concluded in his test of Oates & Schwab’s model of perfectly competitive behavior of
local and state government that,
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there is a great deal of fluidity in current state and local fiscal environment, with
competition pushing some governments toward benefit taxation, while other
governments resist such moves, presumably for reasons of equity, (p. 150).
Musgrave and Musgrave (1989) argue that distribution is a policy issue more so than a
market outcome. They warn that there is a limit to redistribution, “a further increase in
tax rates eventually hits a ceiling”, (p. 83), and that society must accept some efficiency
costs with an equity gain, but argue that the cost should be minimized.
A subcategory in the public finance literature on equity as redistribution focuses
on tax equity. Tax equity can be defined as having each taxpayer contribute his or her
fair share to the cost of government (Smith, 1776; Musgrave & Musgrave, 1989), which
could be expanded to include imposing a higher tax burden on those with greater ability
to pay (Giertz, McGuire & Nowlan, 1996), but avoids questions such as what is a fair
share, and also how much should be the imposition. Adam Smith’s original perspectives
and treatises emphasized the need for progressive taxation (tied to the benefits of an
absence of chaos) establishing the normative value that progressive tax payments were
inherently equitable.
Fairness in taxation is also conceived of in terms of horizontal and vertical equity.
Horizontal equity involves an individual’s ability to pay, while vertical equity is
concerned with the distributions of burdens across individuals with differing abilities to
pay (Giertz, McGuire, & Nowlan, 1996). Some approaches that can be used for
redistribution in this arena are tax-transfer schemes, progressive taxation, and taxes on
expensive luxury items with subsidies to other goods purchased by person of lower
income (Musgrave & Musgrave, 1989). There are two parts to any tax, the base and the
rate. There are three ways to measure the tax base: ad valorem (the dollar value), excise
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(the number of units or by volume), or grouped by classes based on same criteria such as
permits and licenses (Carter & Hildreth, 1992). There are two types of rates. The first
type is called face, nominal or statutory, and the second type is effective. The face rate is
what is listed in formal statements; the effective rate is the amount of tax actually paid,
and these two types can differ greatly (Musgrave & Musgrave, 1989; Carter & Hildreth,
1992).
Throughout U.S. history property tax has been the purview of local jurisdictions
(Musgrave & Musgrave, 1989), and remains the primary revenue source for localities
with school districts almost totally dependent and counties heavily reliant on it (Carter &
Hildreth, 1992). When discussing property tax equity in particular, one could argue there
exists a redistributive relationship between tax burden and an ability to pay by virtue of
housing price: "Property taxes on real estate are loosely related to ability to pay because
wealthier persons are likely to own more expensive homes, but the relationship is not
tight" (Rubin, 2005, p. 47).
For property taxation, vertical equity describes a state where differences between
assessed values and market values are equal across property value ranges (IAAO, 2004).
For example, lower value homes should be assessed at an equal proportion of their
market value, as are homes of higher values (Allen & Dare, 2002).

The reality is often

an over-assessment of property of low-income homeowners (Ross, Levine, Stedman &
Murray, 1991). Assessment is defined as the process of determining the value of
property or land for tax purposes (Carter & Hildreth, 1992). Inequities already occur
between the tax rates of given jurisdictions, but these differing rates are assumed to be

57

known (or easily retrieved) by the informed potential homebuyer. However, the
assessment process is somewhat ambiguous:
The greatest problems facing property tax appraisers is that to arrive at a pinpoint,
accurate tax bill, which is the primary focus of taxpayers, one must go through a
process beginning with the appraisal, which, by its nature, is only an estimate.
(Clark, 1996, p. 27)
Sjoquist and Pandey (2001) found horizontal and vertical inequities in their examination
of disparity ratios (assessment-to-sales) for residential properties post-Proposition 13 in
California. Bowman and Mikesell (1978) examined differences in property tax
assessment uniformity in Virginia, and found that about 70 percent of the variation in
property tax assessment is associated with uncontrollable economic and housing market
factors. Variations in assessment-to-sales ratios among properties impose different
effective rates on otherwise equally-situated properties resulting in "arbitrarily high
portions of governmental costs to certain properties" (p. 137). Musgrave and Musgrave
(1989) concur, commenting that although there are policy reasons for differentiating
between types of property, the actual practice results in "substantial and unjustifiable
differentiation between specific properties within the same general category" (p. 417).
Birch, Sunderman, and Smith (2004) attempt to uncover vertical inequity at the
neighborhood level using median assessment ratios and find inequities in several
neighborhoods, accounting for fifty percent of total home sales in the city.
A common approach in the academic literature is juxtaposing equity against some
other policy objective: equity versus growth, ability-to-pay versus benefit, efficiency
versus equity. Swanstrom (1985) describes tax abatement as being "the classic tradeoff
between equality and growth", (p. 139). Giertz, McGuire, Nowlan (1996) argue that
policy objectives of efficiency, equity and simplicity are often mutually incompatible,
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and cite “sin” taxes an example of placing a disproportionate amount of the tax burden on
lower-income people. Bartik (1991) argues the need for long-term consideration because
local growth may push up property values to a greater extent than it increases real wages
or employment prospects for the bottom part of the income distribution.
One can be more optimistic, viewing the above as false dichotomies. For
example, Hill claims that while efficiency and equity do not necessarily fit hand-in-glove,
they can because asset building is community development, which is where equity is
housed. A policy can be designed to redistribute in order to create opportunity (such as
low income housing set-asides) or to redistribute income (personal communication,
November 2006). In following this logic, the ability for equitable growth to occur or for
efficiency and equity to coexist is possible in a well-designed policy. Bier, et al. (2007)
saw a redistribution of wealth in terms of increased market value of non-abated
residential properties in Cleveland; the geographically closer the non-abated home was to
an abated home, the greater the value increase. This study examines whether such
desirable changes are seen at a larger geographic level—the neighborhood. Others argue
that most public services (public safety, environmental, infrastructure, libraries)
redistribute wealth because they benefit all residents, unless a service is specifically tied
to property (Netzer, 1997), which is the case with RPTA. When talking about residential
tax abatement and equity, the implication seems to be that there is some aspect of the
policy that gives an unfair advantage to some people at the expense of others, and that
something of value needs to be redistributed to members of the community in order to
compensate for this perceived unfair advantage. The language in the Ohio Revised Code
emphasizes what would be considered economic outcomes such as increasing household
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incomes and local investment. However, the legislative language does not include
explicit objectives addressing equity considerations. It could be argued that RPTA
programs are, by definition, equitable programs at the neighborhood level because they
target formerly underserved areas in order to provide new opportunities to the
disadvantaged who already reside in those areas. RPTA critics argue the opposite
position suggesting abatements do not help the poor but merely provides a tax break to
middle- and upper-income households. Sands, Reese and Khan (2006) argue this point
for incentives to firms in that "selectively reducing the burden of local property taxes
seems to provide the greatest benefits to prosperous firms and prosperous communities,
raising serious questions of equity" (p. 54). Conversely, one could argue that RPTA acts
as an [small] equalizer in that it makes certain desirable housing affordable to those who
could not afford it otherwise.

2.5.3 Neighborhood Change
Both Galster (2001) and Aber, Gephart, Brooks-Gunn and Connell (1997) argue
that changes in neighborhoods are driven by external forces. Galster (2001) states that,
"the most fundamental sorts of neighbourhood changes are externally induced" (p. 2118).
Aber, et al. (1997) use social disorganization theory to examine the impact
neighborhoods have on the individuals living there, and present a set of exogenous forces
(globalization, economic restructuring, migration, public policies) they say shape the
characteristics of neighborhoods and communities. Chow and Coutlon (1998) test
empirically William Julius Wilson’s hypothesis that the social conditions of inner-city
neighborhoods are worsening because those conditions have become concentrated over

60

time (concentration effects). Examining Cleveland’s inner-city areas, the authors found
that eight of the ten indictors of negative social conditions increased, and that these
conditions became increasingly intertwined over time.
Coulson and Leichenko (2004) examined the impact of historical designation on
three common theories of neighborhood change: tipping, gentrification, and filtering.
Tipping is the change in racial or ethnic composition of a neighborhood or community,
where there is some threshold amount of “other” that is reached and becomes intolerant
for the majority to continue to reside in that area. Gentrification is the dramatic shift in
neighborhood composition toward residents with higher levels of educational
achievements and income (Freeman & Braconi, 2004). Filtering describes the process of
poorer families occupying older homes that originally were built for higher income
households because the slow decay of the housing stock encouraged higher income
households to move away (Rosenthal, 2008). Coulson and Leichenko (2004) found that
historic designation of a neighborhood does not support these theories of neighborhood
change, and does not lead to any neighborhood turnover based upon demographic
composition of neighborhoods. Similarly, Freeman and Braconi (2004) did not find rapid
turnover due to gentrification in New York City neighborhoods in the 1990s. However,
Rosenthal (2008) did find filtering to impact neighborhood change, although the duration
of change attributed to filtering varied among neighborhoods.
RPTA was conceived of because of decline and disinvestment in city
neighborhoods. Keating and Smith (1996) outline three categories of causes for urban
decline: physical decline (technological, architectural), institutional factors (zoning, code
enforcement) and social characteristics (i.e., racial composition). It can be argued that
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RPTA addresses all three categories, albeit to varying degrees. The policy most
obviously addresses the physical decline of an area through incentives for new
construction, as well as rehabilitation and historic preservation of existing structures.
Communities promoting RPTA support use of the policy and address institutional factors
by, for instance, allowing rezoning of areas for residential development and declaring
areas as historical districts. Finally, RPTA can address social characteristics by creating
a supply of housing in urban areas that potentially increases the number of middle to
higher income households in that neighborhood. To date no local RPTA policy has
explicitly listed changes in racial or ethnic housing segregation patterns as a policy
objective and, unless a community specifically markets these areas in order to affect such
change, it is likely that the current racial or ethnic compositions of the respective
neighborhoods will remain. If Jane Jacobs (1961) is correct that it is the city that is the
true player in the worldwide economic game, then the vitality of city neighborhoods can
be seen as fundamental to America’s economic strength and RPTA as one way to
improve the overall strength of a city through inducing desirable changes in its
neighborhoods.
Jacobs (1961) advocated that new construction should be introduced gradually
rather than "cataclysmically" into an urban area, viewing new construction "as an
ingredient of neighborhood diversity instead of as a form of standardization" (p. 423),
and Galster (2001) concurs: "when new neighborhoods are created through large-scale
construction or rehabilitation projects, they can change the relative attractiveness of
existing neighborhoods" (p. 2115). City officials could counter that the reality of vast
expanses of dilapidated structures and vacant lots, in addition to depressed local
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economies, leave the city no choice but to introduce large development projects and
incentives such as RPTA to bring residents back to the city. The question is whether
there is a level or threshold at which such large-scale RPTA developments are associated
with desirable changes in these areas.

2.5.4 Theory of Broken Windows
The theory of broken windows was presented in Wilson and Kelling’s essay in
which they argue that disorder and crime are linked "in a kind of developmental
sequence" where, "...if a window is broken and is left unrepaired, all the rest of the
windows will soon be broken” (1982, p. 30). Following this logic, a broken window
represents an unstable neighborhood where people do not take care of their property.
Serious crime may not yet flourish, so the argument goes, but is likely coming down the
pike if the trajectory of disorder and disrepair continues. Broken windows policing as a
public safety policy is an approach whereby a community has aggressive policing efforts
for lower-level crimes (Corman & Mocan, 2005). Some trace the theory of broken
windows to a broader incivilities thesis, which posits that neighborhood disorder can lead
to residents withdrawing from the community and increasing their fear of crime in their
community (Hinkle & Weisburd, 2008). Wilson and Kelling (1982) cite a study
conducted by the Police Foundation examining the use of foot patrol as a way of cutting
crime. Although the study found that foot patrol did not reduce crime, residents
perceived foot patrolled areas as safer, and had a more favorable opinion of police. They
further cite a study of a Boston public housing project where the greatest fears were
expressed by persons living in disorderly buildings, not in the buildings with the most
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crime. The authors also claim that there are informal codes of acceptable neighborhood
conduct that is represented by order and a distrust of outsiders, and the key to effective
broken windows policing is to
identify neighborhoods at the tipping point--where the public order is
deteriorating but not un-reclaimable, where the streets are used frequently but by
apprehensive people, where a window is likely to be broken at any time, and must
quickly be fixed if all are not to be shattered. (p. 35)
Wilson (2002) cites Kelling's continued research as supportive of broken windows,
wherein an increase in the number of misdemeanor arrests was accompanied by a
decrease in serious crime after controlling for high unemployment, drug use, and increase
in young men of crime-prone age. Giacopassi and Forde (2000) conducted a study that
lends support to broken windows and links homicide with traffic fatality rates, which are
used as proxies for incivility and aggression. They amusingly conclude that broken
windows policing needs to include “crumpled fenders” policing, for if one can ignore
traffic laws with impunity perhaps one could get away with other more serious crimes in
the area: "broken windows and crumpled fenders both may be seen as indicators that
police are either unconcerned or lack the ability to enforce community standards" (p.
403). Freeman (1999) comments that additional police patrols at criminal hot spots have
been shown to be effective.
The theory of broken windows is not without its critics (e.g., Sampson &
Raudenbush, 1997; 1999; Morenoff, Sampson, & Raudenbush, 2001). Sampson &
Raudenbush (1997;1999) found concentrated poverty and mixed land use to be associated
with physical and social disorder, and argue that it is collective efficacy that explains
lower rates of crime and observed disorder, not aggressive policing for low-level crimes.
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The authors define collective efficacy as “social cohesion among neighbors combined
with their willingness to intervene on behalf of the common good” (1997, p. 918). They
conclude that the link between broken windows policing and crime is unsupported,
except possibly for robbery. It has been argued in the literature that the theory does not
suppose a direct link between disorder and crime, but rather with fear of crime and a
withdrawing from the neighborhood by residents as mediating factors between disorder
and crime (Hinkle & Weisburd, 2008). Corman and Mocan (2005) used misdemeanor
arrests as their measure of broken windows policing, and controlled for economic and
deterrence effects. They found that misdemeanor arrests had an impact on motor vehicle
theft, robbery and grand larceny, but “we do not find strong evidence to support the
contention that broken-windows policing strategy affects other crimes" (p. 262).
Hinkle and Weisburd (2008) recently found an unexpected outcome. They noted
that police intervention for lower-level crimes significantly increased the probability of
residents’ feeling unsafe. While they did find support for the notion that disorder leads to
a fear of crime, they suggest that communities need to focus on how broken windows
policing is implemented. Pertinent to this dissertation, the authors also found physical
disorder, literally broken windows, to be significantly and positively related to fear of
crime. Other potentially negative consequences for increased broken windows policing
are its impact on the civil liberties of minorities, higher cost of police resources, and the
impact misdemeanor arrests will have on future labor market viability for individuals
(Corman & Mocan, 2005).
One question common in the criminal justice literature on this topic is whether
people’s perceptions or objective measures of neighborhood characteristics are more
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significantly related to crime. For example, Schafer, Huebner and Bynum (2006) found
that “fear and safety were related more with subjective perceptions of neighborhood
quality than with objective measures of neighborhood dangers" (p. 296). Austin, Furr
and Spine (2002) used a standardized scheme for evaluating the conditions of
neighborhoods rather than residents’ perceptions, and found that housing quality affected
both neighborhood satisfaction and perceptions of safety. Physical deterioration of a
neighborhood increased perceptions of danger. They conclude, "neighborhoods, as
sources of identity and social support, were undermined if the neighborhood was in
disrepair" (p. 426). A favorable answer to either position is important when analyzing
the potential impact RPTA has on a neighborhood measure of crime. If perceptions have
a greater impact, then a well-designed policy of broken windows policing may be useful
in allaying residents’ fears. Similarly, if it is characteristics such as physically decaying
structures, abandoned cars and excess litter that impacts people’s opinions about their
neighborhood, then maybe increasing annual expenditures for police and community
development (i.e., “weed-and-seed”) would have greater impact (Ren, Zhao & Lovrich,
2008).
RPTA may impact the theory of broken windows in that a neighborhood’s
physical disorder or disrepair (i.e., blight) is a significant factor associated with residents’
fear of crime or perceptions of safety. RPTA creates new physical structures in an area
and, in many cases blight was removed in order to erect these new homes. Further,
neighborhood stability has been shown to have a significant association with lowering
fear of crime, and RPTA contributes to neighborhood stability by increasing
homeownership. Also, one of the goals of RPTA is to increase population in designated
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areas but, as Freeman (1999) points out, “a one percent increase in crime rate induces a
one to two percent decrease in city population. The effect is larger for families with kids
and higher income groups” (p. 356). Thus, the inclusion of some kind of discussion
regarding crime is relevant to an analysis of RPTA’s impact on neighborhoods.
Summarizing survey responses from RPTA homeowners in Cleveland, Bier, et al. (2007)
comment:
Respondents did not indicate a willingness to accept reduced property taxes for
assuming higher risks related to crime. There is a clear indication that
respondents are as interested in safe neighborhoods as they are in getting as much
house possible for their money (p. 44).

2.5.5

American Ideology: The anti-urban—pro-rural dichotomy
Warner (1962) describes a contradiction that could be referred to as an anti-

urban—pro-rural dichotomy wherein the city is viewed as artificial and incomplete while
the country is perceived as simple, timeless and gratifying. Warner traces this dichotomy
back at least to Roman times, but argues it is imitated in the United States by the ideal of
the English county gentleman who goes to the city for business while "at the same time
living a well-rounded life on his estate" (p. 13). Before street railway, this was
accomplished through having a city residence and a country house. Improvements in
transportation made the ability to work in the city and live in the hinterland a reality for
the more mobile middle- and upper-income classes. This dichotomy continues to
influence residential development in America. What began as early American sentiments
of anti-urbanism, rural living as moral goodness, the noble yeoman farmer, and the
conquest of frontier America continue to operate in the collective American psyche as we
pursue our residential settings in the 21st century.
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2.5.5.1 Anti-Urbanism
Anti-urban sentiment has a long history in American thought and can be traced back
to the writing of the founding fathers, notably in the letters of Thomas Jefferson. For
instance, in a letter to Dr. Benjamin Rush during Philadelphia’s yellow fever epidemic,
Jefferson (1800) wrote:
The yellow fever will discourage the growth of great cities in our nation, & I view
great cities as pestilential to the morals, the health and the liberties of man. True,
they nourish some of the elegant arts, but the useful ones can thrive elsewhere, and
less perfection in the others, with more health, virtue & freedom, would be my
choice.
Dr. Rush concurred, stating that cities are “reservoirs of all the impurities of a
community” (Letter to Thomas Jefferson, October 6, 1800).
The out-migration of urban populations to the hinterland is deeply rooted in this
anti-urban sentiment, described in Warner’s Streetcar Suburbs (1962) as
…an attitude which had always contained the notion of escape from city
restraints, organizations, and objects. The city's ways and forms were conceived
of as too artificial and of the wrong quality to support a moral life. (p. 12)
Clapp (1978) argued that urban problems fuel negative images of urban life and force
those who are mobile to "opt for departure at the earliest opportunity", (p. 1). Once they
have “escaped”, suburban residents wanted the political autonomy of being separate from
the central city and its problems, and to keep the "problems" in the city by use of
exclusionary zoning (Booth, 2002).
Anti-urban perceptions are continuing into the twenty-first century, although
Walker and Fortmann (2003) argue that today's anti-urban attitudes differ from those of
the nineteenth century middle class. They argue that the current perception is a fear of the
city, rather than the nineteenth century view of the city as an unhealthy environment in
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need of change (e.g., better sanitation, green space). They argue that this distinction has
led to retreat and indifference: "today the bourgeoisie has lost much of its guilty
conscience about cities. It has retreated to purified spaces in the countryside" (p. 58).
Bayoh, Irwin, and Haab (2006) concur, arguing that current residential community choice
decisions are driven more by flight-from-blight factors than by natural evolution.
Arguably the greatest factor impacting forsaken city neighborhoods is racism and the
perceived urban woes attributed to African Americans. As Glaab & Brown (1967)
describe it,
Racial segregation drastically limited the possibility of upward mobility by
individual or group. The black metropolises...were areas where few could benefit
from the economic and cultural advantages of the city but where all the longstanding urban problems of crime, poverty, and disease existed in aggravated
form...and reflected a general tendency to increased economic and cultural
segregation in the twentieth century metropolis...the wealthier and more powerful
members of the community steadily moved to the outer zones of the city and to
the new suburban areas. (p. 287)
As city public officials attempt to combat anti-urban bias and to curb the flow of
population out of their cities, the notion of providing incentives to influence the location
decisions of households and businesses became an important public policy pursuit.

2.5.5.2 The Rural Ideal
Along with anti-urban sentiment, the pursuit of the rural ideal can be traced back
to early American thought. The Jeffersonian vision of the good and moral life was to be
found in the country (Booth, 2002), and exemplified in early writings to that effect:
I think our [American] governments will remain virtuous for many centuries; as
long as they are chiefly agricultural…When they get piled upon one another in
large cities, as in Europe, they will become corrupt as in Europe. (Jefferson, 1787)

69

In the 1800s, moving to the suburbs was how the rural ideal was pursued by city
dwellers. According to Glaab (1963) the flight from the city was not a post-WWII
phenomenon and "as early as 1823, a New York real estate advertisement described
country lots an easy 15-25 minutes by foot from the city's business district” (p. 229). In
1873, a pamphlet described real estate offices as being
crowded daily with eager purchasers, and everybody...is kept busy explaining
subdivisions, answering questions...and such other points as the prospective
ruralist would naturally take into consideration. (emphasis added, In Glaab, 1963,
p. 233)
The nineteenth century pursuit of the rural ideal affected modern planning policy by
supporting the notion that open small communities were the best settings for family life
(Warner, 1962). Public policy encouraged the expansion of public services so that this
ideal could be realized, thus influencing the way in which American cities developed. A
century later, public programs such as residential property tax abatement were
implemented as a way to try and recapture the disappearing residential base of the city.
The pursuit of the rural ideal continues, with people moving several communities
away from the perceived border of decaying cities, which now includes their older
suburbs. As Booth (2002) describes it, “The countryside beyond the suburbs seems to be
gaining magnetic powers” (p. 4), and this migration “seems to be motivated by values
that are essentially rural in origin" (p. 2). In a recent study conducted by the Pew
Research Center (Morin & Taylor, 2009), a nationally representative sample was asked,
if you could live anywhere would you prefer to live in a city, a suburb, a rural area or a
small town. Only 25 percent said the suburb is their ideal community type, with small
towns and rural living comprising 51 percent of responses. Given the nature of this
dissertation, it is interesting that 23 percent of respondents chose urban living as their
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preference, which may bode well for city officials trying to lure residents back into urban
neighborhoods. In a different survey, wherein one thousand randomly selected registered
voters in the Sierra Nevada region were asked why they moved to the region, one of the
dominant responses was the ability to live in a rural area (Booth, 2002). Walker and
Fortmann (2003) concur, citing that "a typically well-educated middle-to-upper class
migrated to Nevada County seeking refuge from the city and pleasure in being close to a
perceived 'natural' landscape" (p. 484).
Jeffersonian views continue their influence on American culture and can be found
in the romantic view of the American family farm, embodied in the noble yeoman farmer.
Farming is perceived to produce the human virtues of patience, humility, and a hard work
ethic (Mariola, 2005), as well as producing real “American heroes” (Peterson, 1990).
Generally, Americans with enough mobility can pursue such romantic notions when
making decisions about where they will live and raise a family. As Peterson (1990)
describes it, "The American pastoral's synthesis of progress and tradition...beckons
endless numbers of newcomers into the garden" (p. 12).
In reality Americans are not leaving city or suburban types of employment to
work on the farm but rather to live in low-density housing divisions, what Mariola (2005)
describes as "countrified city", and exemplified by the mid-1970s accelerated loss of
productive cropland to urban populations moving to the countryside. He criticizes this
purely economic approach to land use, arguing that
Pastures and parking lots are not compared using aesthetic or ethical criteria, but
on a cost-benefit basis only...There is simply no recognition that land may have
any value other than the money that changes hands upon its purchase. The land is
more 'valuable' as a farm for the sole reason that the developer cannot afford to
turn it into a park[ing lot].
(p. 215)
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Another variation on the theme of the rural ideal is the romantic notion of the
American frontier, which is also interrelated to the other attitudes previously discussed.
In essence, "While the American frontier and Jeffersonian agrarianism represent distinct
myths, the two are interconnected in agricultural discourse" with "the myth of the
agrarian frontier retain[ing] a significant role in contemporary land-use rhetoric"
(Peterson, 1990, p. 9). Indeed, whether it is the romantic view of the American frontier
or that of the yeoman farmer, it can be argued that both archetypes may help explain
migration patterns out of cities (Louv, 2008).
Like their yeoman brothers, brave men were carved from the hard work needed to
tame nature, resulting in the mythic hero of the American frontiersman. According to
Louv (2008), there are three American frontiers. The first was the actual Lewis and
Clark type frontier expansion. The second frontier was a romantic link to and respect for
the family farm described by Peterson (1990) as, “the newly-acquired farm lands
represent a frontier that promises the satisfaction of all demands and the reconciliation of
all contradictions” (p. 13). The second and third frontiers occurred concurrently, with the
third frontier comprised of what Peterson (1990) describes as a “suburban manifest
destiny, when boys still imagined themselves woodsmen and scouts, and girls still
yearned to live in a little house on the prairie” (p. 18). In essence anti-urban bias and
romantic notions of rural living, Jeffersonian agrarianism and the American frontier myth
all feed an urban exodus, are implicitly ingrained in the American psyche, and continue
to influence residential location decisions that have a detrimental impact on America’s
urban neighborhoods.
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2.6 Conclusion
The major findings of this literature review as they relate to this dissertation are first,
that administrators of RPTA are constantly trying to balance between public and private
interests in an effort to increase development in certain geographic areas of the city. The
hope is that increased development would start a cycle of increased revenues for the city,
leading to increased levels of public goods and services for the residents provided at
lower costs (resulting from the presence of more higher-valued real estate), leading to
higher levels of resident satisfaction that contributes over time to higher levels of
development reflected an increased demand to live in urban areas. This theory is
examined through the hypotheses posed in this study regarding the relationship between
RPTA and private sector development, namely certain aspects of the housing lending
market and number of businesses.
Second, a discussion of inter-jurisdictional competition (IJC) was included because
it addresses a pragmatic and real concern for municipalities trying to revitalize their
urban neighborhoods through offering incentives and whether or not these incentives are
working. In other words, are tax incentives for firms and residents fulfilling the original
intentions of policymakers? As noted, much of the academic literature is concerned with
incentives for firms, which is why this dissertation helps to fill a void in the literature by
addressing incentives for residents. If study results indicate that RPTA holds desirable
relationships with measured changes in urban neighborhoods, then one could infer that
from the perspective of the central city RPTA does not adversely affect IJC. In essence,
urban neighborhoods have become options for mobile residents once again.
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Third, a discussion of equity was included in the literature review because the term
is defined and operationalized in this dissertation as one of the indicators of
neighborhood change. Because equity is a concept neither universally defined nor
commonly examined in studies of tax incentives, an extensive discussion of the concept
seemed warranted. Fourth, a brief discussion of common theories of neighborhood
change was included in this review because these theories set the stage for why incentive
policies such as RPTA were even conceived by policymakers, namely that urban
neighborhoods were no longer attractive because of changing neighborhood
characteristics over time. Moreover, this dissertation examines the impact of RPTA on a
set of indicators of neighborhood change, which is how policy effectiveness is being
defined for purposes of this study.
This study hypothesizes that RPTA will have a significant relationship with crime.
There is, however, no agreed upon approach to defining, recording or measuring the
concept. Therefore, the theory of broken windows was included in this review of the
literature as the selected approach to examining crime in urban neighborhoods. The final
section included a discussion of a pervasive view impacting residential location
decisions, namely an anti-urban—pro-rural bias. This dichotomy, grounded in hundreds
of years of American migratory patterns, has currency today because it continues to
influence people’s location decisions. Therefore, if results of this study suggest that
RPTA has no significant relationship with measures of neighborhood change, then such
policies as they are currently administered may be ineffective in stemming the flow of
population from urban areas.
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CHAPTER III
FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES

3.1 Conceptual Framework
This study is an exploration of a popular public policy program intended to
stimulate redevelopment in designated urban areas. As such, it is useful to develop a
conceptual framework that (1) links the policy with the observed context from which it
arises, (2) identifies the theoretical concepts influencing policy development, and (3)
makes explicit the desired policy outcomes. Figure 1, Exploring the Impact of
Residential Property Tax Abatement (RPTA) Programs on Indicators of Neighborhood
Change, is the conceptual model constructed for this study, and outlines a way in which
RPTA may be related to urban neighborhoods. This conceptual model is derived from
the academic literature and from legislation discussed previously in the literature review.
The Observed Context for Action included in the conceptual model is a broad
brush-stroke of the conditions of Ohio’s urban areas prior to the implementation of
RPTA. Similar to other cities in the “rust belt,” Ohio cities were suffering from
depressed housing market conditions including a lack of mortgage lending activity and
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depressed local economies as the state continued to lose its manufacturing base. Within
such older metropolitan areas, businesses were relocating to outlying areas (Bogart &
Ferry, 1999; Lee, 2007), and the population levels in center cities declined in response to
perceived negative social conditions such as high crime and poverty rates, and negative
physical conditions such as a dilapidated housing stock and decaying infrastructure (e.g.,
Kasarda, Appold, Sweeney & Sieff, 1997; Freeman, 1999). In addition, declining
transportation and communication costs made it easier for businesses and residents to
move to decentralized locations (e.g., Warner, 1962; Judd & Swanstrom, 2002). It is
these observations of urban neighborhood decline that not only generated theories
attempting to explain these observations but also influenced the development of financial
incentives as desired public policy. Referring to Figure 1, the first theory to be discussed
as influenced by the Observed Context of Action and influencing the Policy Action taken
is inter-jurisdictional competition (IJC). City officials view RPTA as a way of effectively
competing with surrounding jurisdictions for the limited resource of residents of higher
socio-economic status. Underpinning the concept of IJC is the classical theory of supply
and demand. Because housing conditions in urban neighborhoods were perceived as no
longer desirable, policy makers provided direct incentives such as providing
infrastructure improvements and/or waiving of fees, along with promises of the future
incentive of profits from new construction sales, in order to increase the housing supply.
On the demand side, policy makers provided several years of property tax abatement to
homebuyers in exchange for choosing to purchase homes in designated CRAs.
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Figure 1

Conceptual Model: Exploring the Relationships between Residential Property Tax
Abatement Programs & Indicators of Neighborhood Change

Observed Context for Action
Depressed Local Housing
Market Conditions
• Depressed Local Economies
• Negative Social Conditions
• Negative Physical Conditions
•

•
•
•
•
•

Theory
Inter-jurisdictional
Competition
Neighborhood Change
Anti‐Urban/Pro‐Rural
Dichotomy
Broken Windows
Equity

Policy Action
Residential
Property Tax
Abatement

Desired Policy Outcomes
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•

Increased Private Investment
Removal of Blight
Decrease in Number of Crimes
Tax Equity

Changed Context
Improved Local Housing Market Conditions
Improved Local Economies
Improved Social Conditions
Improved Physical Conditions
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Second, theories of neighborhood change have attempted to explain the trajectory
of decline in urban neighborhoods. Moreover, ideas about neighborhood change have
influenced RPTA policy development. For example, the idea of filtering supports the
notion that aging housing stock is less desirable than new construction. A designated
CRA can become gentrified as pockets of RPTA new housing are developed, which can
also result in patterns of racial and economic segregation in an area if housing
development is not affirmatively marketed (defined as making a deliberate effort to reach
more than white and higher income potential homeowners through targeting marketing
campaigns to reach diverse populations).
Third, an American anti-urban bias that is rooted in negative feelings about racial
and ethnic minorities and poor people (e.g., Glaab & Brown, 1967; Booth, 2002) has fed
the exodus of people from urban neighborhoods into the suburbs, and a pro-rural bias has
continued to influence residential location choices beyond suburban areas (e.g., Warner,
1962; Walker & Fortmann, 2003; Morin & Taylor, 2009). RPTA can be seen as one way
in which city officials try to influence these location decisions through the offering of a
financial incentive in order to lure people back to urban neighborhoods through pricing
effects. An issue is whether or not the fiscal incentives offset any perceived biases or
preferences for suburban and more homogenous communities.
Fourth, the theory of broken windows and its influence on crime relates to RPTA
policy in that new market rate housing development should have the desired impact of
decreasing the level of criminal activity in these designated areas by decreasing blight
and increasing neighborhood stability through increased levels of homeownership.
Finally, according to public finance theory, one of the normative considerations in
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creating tax policy such as RPTA should be tax equity. Indeed, one indictment against
RPTA policy is that it creates vertical property tax inequity by placing an increased tax
burden on the non-abated homes in the area, which are generally of lower value
(Bartimole, 2007).
In the conceptual model, there is a set of Desired Policy Outcomes expected to
result from effective administration of RPTA and is derived from the legislation. One
desired outcome is that RPTA will increase private investment in areas that have
experienced disinvestment. Private investment is increased through increased availability
of market rate housing followed by increased mortgage lending activity to purchase said
housing. The resulting increase in the residential population in designated areas should
result in increased activity in the local economy because of increased demand for goods
and services. The second outcome—decrease in blight—should be achieved as RPTA
helps to increase the number of owner-occupied homes, resulting in decreased blight as
homeowners maintain their properties and influence others to maintain their properties
thus improving the physical conditions of the area. Another desired policy outcome is a
decrease in the number of crimes, which is expected as the physical landscape improves
and more homes become owner-occupied. Tax equity is the final desired outcome
evaluated in this study and is derived from the political debate of RPTA, specifically
addressing the criticism that RPTA places a higher tax burden on those who can least
afford it, and also derived from public finance theory that tax policies should be
equitable.
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3.2 Hypothesis
The research question is whether there is a statistical relationship between
residential property tax abatement (RPTA) and changes in urban neighborhoods as
measured on a set of indicators. Table 5 presents the specific hypotheses as they pertain
to each of the neighborhood indicators stated in the research question.

Table 5
Hypotheses Representing Indicators of Neighborhood Change
Hypothesis

References

H1

RPTA is significantly (+) related to home
purchase mortgage loan approval rates.

Galster, et al. (2004; 2005); ORC
3735.65; local ordinances.

H2

RPTA is significantly (+) related to the
number of home purchase mortgage loan
applications.

Galster, et al. (2004; 2005); ORC
3735.65; local ordinances.

H3

RPTA is significantly (+) related to the
median dollar amount of home purchase
mortgage loans originated.

Galster, et al. (2004, 2005); ORC
3735.65; local ordinances.

H4

RPTA is significantly related (+) to the
number of businesses.

Galster, et al. (2004, 2005); ORC
3735.65; local ordinances.

H5

RPTA is significantly related (-) to Type I
crimes.

Corman & Mocan (2005); Toledo
Ord. No. 170-04; NEO CANDO.

H6

RPTA is significantly related (-) to Type II
crimes.

Corman & Mocan (2005); Toledo
Ord. No. 170-04; NEO CANDO.

H7

RPTA is significantly related to assessment
ratios.

Birch, Sunderman & Smith, (2004);
Cornia & Slade, (2005).
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The first four specific hypotheses are designed to measure the first two policy
outcomes in the conceptual model. It is hypothesized that RPTA will have a significant
relationship with measures of private investment primarily as they relate to the mortgage
lending industry and number of businesses. First, it is expected that RPTA will be
significantly and positively correlated with home purchase mortgage loan approval rates.
A positive correlation is interpreted to mean that an increase in the approval rates of
home purchase mortgage loans will be significantly associated with having RPTA homes
in a neighborhood. Second, it is expected that RPTA is positively correlated with the
number of home purchase mortgage loan applications. A positive correlation is
interpreted to mean that an increase in the number of home purchase mortgage loan
applications will be associated with the presence of RPTA homes in a neighborhood.
Third, it is expected that RPTA will be positively correlated with the median dollar
amount of home purchase mortgage loans originated. A positive correlation is interpreted

to mean that an increase in the median dollar amount of home purchase mortgage loans
originated will be significantly associated with the presence of RPTA homes in a

neighborhood. Fourth, it is expected that RPTA will be positively correlated with the
number of businesses. A positive correlation is interpreted to mean that an increase in the
number of businesses will be associated with having RPTA homes in a neighborhood.
It is expected that criminal activity is negatively related to RPTA. In other words,
the presence of RPTA homes in a neighborhood will result in a decrease in Type I Crimes
and Type II Crimes. Type I Crimes are violent crimes and property crimes, while Type II
crimes include all other lesser crimes such as vandalism and disorderly conduct. This
categorization is one way of separating “broken windows” criminal activity (i.e., Type II
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Crimes) from more serious crimes. Results from the academic literature testing broken
windows hypotheses are conflicting and “crime” is a complicated behavior to
operationalize. Therefore, it seems reasonable to categorize criminal activity in some
logical manner. This particular categorical scheme is taken from the Center on Urban
Poverty and Social Change from the Mandel School of Social Sciences at Case Western
Reserve University through their NEO CANDO online database system. Finally, it is
expected there will be a significant association between RPTA neighborhoods and
assessment ratios. In essence, the presence of RPTA homes in a neighborhood should be
significantly related to the assessment-to-value ratios for homes. One-tailed tests are
employed for all hypotheses testing because theory indicates the expected direction of
association listed in Table 5. Statistical significance is evaluated at α = .05. In essence,
because a reasonable expectation for any public policy operating at the neighborhood
level is that the policy is at least related to a set of policy outcomes, it is hypothesized
that there will be a significant change in the policy outcomes in neighborhoods with
RPTA, ceteris paribus.

3.3 Null Hypotheses and Significance Testing
The null hypothesis in this study is that there is no statistically significant association
between residential property tax abatement (RPTA) and desired policy objectives as
measured by several indicators of neighborhood change. Table 6 provides the specific
hypotheses for each indicator.
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Table 6
Null Hypotheses Representing Indicators of Neighborhood Change
Null Hypothesis

References

NH1

RPTA is not significantly related to home
purchase mortgage loan approval rates.

Galster, et al. (2004; 2005); ORC
3735.65; local ordinances.

NH2

RPTA is not significantly related to the
number of home purchase mortgage loan
applications.

Galster, et al. (2004; 2005); ORC
3735.65; local ordinances.

NH3

RPTA is not significantly related to the
median dollar amount of home purchase
mortgage loans originated.

Galster, et al. (2004, 2005); ORC
3735.65; local ordinances.

NH4

RPTA is not significantly related to the
number of businesses.

Galster, et al. (2004, 2005); ORC
3735.65; local ordinances.

NH5

RPTA is not significantly related to Type
I crimes.

Corman & Mocan (2005); Toledo
Ord. No. 170-04; NEO CANDO.

NH6

RPTA is not significantly related to Type
II crimes.

Corman & Mocan (2005); Toledo
Ord. No. 170-04; NEO CANDO.

NH7

RPTA is not significantly related to
assessment ratios.

Birch, Sunderman & Smith, (2004);
Cornia & Slade, (2005).

Failure to reject the null hypothesis is consistent with the public choice view that
unfettered competition should remain the preferred public policy course of action, and
residential location decisions should be the purview of housing markets. Failure to reject
the null also results in the rejection of the counter-factual scenario that, if it were not for
RPTA, there would be no significant change in the neighborhood indicators. Conversely,
rejection of the null hypothesis is consistent with the utilitarian principle that RPTA
benefits the greater good, assuming that the associations between RPTA and the
indicators of neighborhood change are in the desirable direction. If the direction of the
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significant associations between RPTA and measurement of neighborhood change are
undesirable, this result lends support to opponents of RPTA and questions the
effectiveness of the policy.
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CHAPTER IV
METHODOLOGY

4.1 Research Question
This study asks whether there is a statistical relationship between residential
property tax abatement (RPTA) and expected changes in urban neighborhoods as
measured on a given set of indicators. These indicators were chosen to operationalize
RPTA policy objectives and are intended to uncover correlations seen at the
neighborhood (i.e., census tract) level. The indicators can be grouped under the broad
concepts of (1) increased private investment; (2) blight removal; (3) decreased criminal
activity; and (4) property tax equity (see Figure 1 in Chapter III). If tracks with RPTA
are not significantly associated with indicators if neighborhood change relative to tracts
without RPTA then the policy, as it is currently being administered, may not be fulfilling
its policy objectives at the neighborhood level. However, if RPTA has the hypothesized
statistical relationships (see Chapter III) with the indicators of neighborhood change, then
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these results lend support to proponents that RPTA may be fulfilling desired policy
objectives to some capacity.

4.2 Research Design
In attempting to devise a research design for this study, the nature of the research
question and the place-based nature of the policy investigated necessarily limited the type
of analysis that could be employed. First, there could not be random assignment; either
the neighborhood had RPTA or it did not and the researcher had no control over which
neighborhoods fell into what category. Second, the level of “treatment” could not be
manipulated; there was no control over the number of tax-abated properties built in a
neighborhood, the value of those homes, or the specific policy parameters (i.e., duration
and rate), or when the homes were built. In essence, this study is a natural experiment,
which has been conceived of as a pretest-posttest non-equivalent group design,
graphically displayed in Figure 2:

Figure 2
Pretest-Posttest Non-Equivalent Group Design
NRs

O1

NRc

O1

X

O2
O2

The pretest (O1) consists of a series of measurements on a set of neighborhood
indicators for 2001, before a majority of RPTA homes were erected, and the posttest (O2)
is a series of measurements on the same set of indicators for 2006. This five-year lag is
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intended to measure the cumulative changes that may have occurred in the outcome
indicators (Galster, et al., 2004). In the above figure, NRs represents the city
neighborhoods (tracts) that have RPTA homes and Nc represents neighborhoods
contiguous to those tracts but without RTPA. The treatment is the number of new
construction one- through three-family units receiving RPTA. A time lag is assumed to
occur between the construction of RPTA units and when market and neighborhood
effects begin to register the change; newly built homes need to be sold and become
occupied. Following Galter et al.’s approach (2004) the time lag in this study is three
years, with the neighborhoods in the subject group consisting of RPTA untis built
through 2003, and posttest measures taken in 2006. While a 2001 pretest measure is not
a “pure” pretest measure because some tracts had RPTA homes built prior to 2001, in this
study the pretest measure is providing control for variation on the neighborhood
indictors, and provides a common temporal starting point for possibly uncovering the
trajectory of change occurring at the neighborhood level on each respective outcome.
Threats to internal validity question the existence of valid causal relationships for
the population being studied (Moss & Yeaton, 2006). Shadish, Cook, and Campbell
(2002) recommend good research design first, followed by statistical adjustments to help
control for these threats. This study makes use of some good design controls such as the
inclusion of pre-test measures and a comparison group. However, there can be no
random assignment or manipulation of treatment, so there are threats that need to be
addressed and if possible, controlled for in order to interpret any valid relationships
between the constructs operationalized in this study. This section lists the possible
threats to the internal validity of the proposed study, and how the researcher expects to
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resolve these issues to the best of her ability and given the constraints established by the
study itself.
The greatest threat to a non-equivalent group design (NEGD) is selection bias
(Trochim, 2006) and may account for observed differences between RPTA and nonRPTA neighborhoods because the groups are non-equivalent by definition (Shadish, et
al., 2002) and these group differences may have existed prior to RPTA. Indeed, it is the
presence of self-selection bias that has resulted in a natural experiment because the
municipalities in the study chose to administer RPTA in certain areas (presumably more
distressed) and not in others. Use of a comparison group helps to diminish this threat,
although the comparison group is de facto self-selected.
The initial comparison group conceived of for this study included all non-RPTA
census tracts for the four cities in the analysis. In order to examine the usefulness of such
a comparison group, the researcher conducted independent samples tests of the pretest
measures. The hypothesis tested in an independent samples test is whether the mean of
each pretest measure is significantly different between groups. Results indicated that
there were significant differences between subject and comparison groups for several of
the variables (p < 0.05). These significant differences remained even after alternately
removing the census tracts for each city. However, when the researcher conducted the
same analysis on a modified comparison group, the group composed of non-RPTA tracts
geographically and politically (within the same municipality) contiguous to the subject
group of tracts, only the number of businesses pretest measure was statistically
significantly different between the two groups at p < 0.05 (Table 1A, Appendix).
Shadish, et al. advise the use of non-equivalent comparison groups in quasi-experimental
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design that are “deliberately chosen to have maximum pretest similarity to the treatment
group on as many observed characteristics as possible”, (2002, p. 159). Therefore, the
contiguous tract comparison group was utilized as the comparison group in this study and
the threat of selection bias was diminished for every neighborhood indicator except
number of businesses.
Another threat to internal validity applicable to this study is history. As Shadish, et
al. (2002) write: “Even in field research…the plausibility of history can be reduced…by
selecting groups from the same general location and by ensuring that the schedule for
testing is the same in both groups” (p. 56). In this study, the above criteria are
maintained in that neighborhoods in both the subject and comparison groups are from the
same geographic locations. Also, variables are included to the model to control for
variation in housing values, economic growth and city over the study period. Although
the researcher attempted to construct as complete a model as possible, which included
using variables that have been derived from a larger set of indicators through previous
research (see Galster et. al, 2004; 2005), there remains the possibility of variable
omission bias.
Attrition/mortality is not a plausible threat to this study because, for the time period
under investigation, no neighborhoods lost or gained designation as RPTA areas.
Theoretically, regression artifacts are possible threats in this study because, assuming
RPTA tracts are suffering from extreme disinvestment relative to non-RPTA tracts, it is
likely that there will be some improvement even if RPTA had no effect. Following the
recommendations in Shadish, et al. (2002) for reducing regression artifacts this analysis
will include the using of two-year averages on HMDA data to help control for extreme
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variability from one year to the next (Chow & Coulton, 1998; Galster, et al., 2005), use a
multivariate function of several variables, and use a comparison group that is not
significantly different from the neighborhoods comprising the subject group when
measured on a set of pretest measures.

4.3 Study Population
The study population is defined as large municipalities in Ohio (greater than
100,000 in population according to the 2000 U.S. Census) that use RPTA as an economic
development policy. Four of the six large Ohio cities are included in this analysis:
Cleveland, Columbus, Dayton, and Toledo. Akron is not included in this analysis
because it does not use RPTA (D. L. Kleinhenz, personal communication, September 21,
2006). Large cities were chosen because they have been using RPTA as a development
policy for several years and, arguably, the health of a region depends upon the strength of
its central city (Shroitman-Sarig, 2006), which presumably includes its neighborhoods.
Further, the population was defined as large Ohio cities because the policy under
investigation is a state-derived policy, and operates at the local governmental level.
Originally, Cincinnati was to be the fifth city included in the analysis. The
required data could not be secured from Cincinnati’s Police Department at a useful
geographic level, from the Hamilton County Sheriff’s Office, nor from the Hamilton
County Auditor at an affordable price. Crime data from the police department were not
available on a geographic level other than precincts, which are too large to provide any
meaningful inferences at the neighborhood level. Even after a faxed data request, an inperson visit and two phone calls, the Hamilton County Sheriff's Office failed to fulfill the
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request for sheriff’s sales data or assist the researcher in locating the appropriate
department or staff person for the data request. The appropriate assessment and sales data
could not be secured without payment of a substantial amount of money. The Assistant
County Auditor for Hamilton County stated that certain files needed to be linked to
census tracts to secure the requested sales and assessment data. In addition, these data for
Hamilton County are propriety and owned by a private vendor (P. Drake, personal
communication, July 8, 2008). The researcher also contacted two faculty members at the
University of Cincinnati who did not have the appropriate data available. In essence, the
only data acquired in a usable format for the City of Cincinnati were the tax-abated
residential properties. The researcher and her dissertation chair agreed that, for these
reasons, the City of Cincinnati would have to be dropped from the analysis, and that this
omission does not reduce the efficacy of the study.

4.4 Statistical Model
Building on the Program Theory Model in Chapter III and modifying Galster, et
al.’s (2004a) impact study of Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) spending,
the chosen statistical model is intended to uncover statistical relationships between the
presence of RPTA homes and changing values of six neighborhood indicators. The
approach taken in this study was determined to be useful because any analysis of the
impact of CBDG funding, RPTA, or any large public policy on neighborhoods is very
often done ex post facto. Indeed, this is a problem with policy analysis in general; the
question of program effectiveness occurs well after the policy is already operating, the
political will is behind its implementation and public dollars are already allocated to the
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program or, at least, to its administration. In addition, the proposed model appears to be
a reasonable attempt at modeling the counterfactual scenario of what the neighborhoods
in the subject group would have looked like in lieu of RPTA. Galster, et al. (2004a) used
cubic regression to uncover any possible threshold effects in CDBG spending. A similar
approach is taken here to uncover any threshold effects in terms of a critical number of
RPTA homes built in a neighborhood at which we see significant changes in the outcome
variables since “cubic regressions permit the estimation of a wide range of nonlinear
relationships, some of which may suggest thresholds” (p. 909).
The statistical model is:
Y06i = a + b1(RPTAi) + b2 (RPTAi2) + b3(RPTAi3) + b4(Y01i) +MHV i +ΔJGi +
SSi +CITY +e
where
a = intercept
b = coefficient
Y06 = 2006 value for outcome indicator Y in neighborhood i
Y01 = 2001 value for outcome indicator Y in neighborhood i
RPTA = number of newly constructed single-, two-, and three-family
residential units through 2003 for neighborhood i
MHV = 2003 median housing value for neighborhood i
ΔJG = rate of change in job growth from 2001 to 2006 for neighborhood i
SS = number of sheriff’s sales in 2006 for neighborhood i
CITY = dummy variable for city
e = random error term
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4.5 Variables
A “measured change in neighborhood indicators” (Galster, et al., 2004) approach
was chosen for this study because of the researcher’s interest in examining housing
policy at the neighborhood level and because policies such as RPTA are designed to be
administered at the neighborhood level.2 The following sections describe the dependent,
independent, and control variables for use in this study. In addition to testing a model of
neighborhood change, this study also tests the assertion that there are a set of robust,
parsimonious neighborhood indicators that are
inexpensive, annually updated, and available for all U.S. communities yet
robustly capture significant variation in these neighborhood dimensions [e.g.,
crime, housing type and tenure, business and employment]”. (Galster, Hayes &
Johnson, 2005, p. 265)
Therefore, in using the approach outlined in this dissertation, a researcher should be able
to get a sense of change happening in urban neighborhoods without having to wait for
such information from the decennial census, which arguably is outdated by the time the
data are released.

4.5.1 Dependent Variables
Determining what constitutes neighborhood change is complex and there is no
agreed upon set of measurements. Therefore, a set of indicators of neighborhood change
was drawn from the literature, namely the work of Galster et al. (2004, 2005), wherein a
set of robust and parsimonious indicators of neighborhood change was developed and
tested for such purposes. As discussed previously, measures for neighborhood crime and
of property tax equity were drawn from the literature and from local legislation. Given
2

Indeed community development corporations, examination of which is beyond the scope of this study, are
an example of a legislative invention to implement policies such as RPTA at the neighborhood level.
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the time needed for completion of housing construction and “the recognition of them by
market forces in the neighborhood” (Galster, et al., 2004, p. 914), there is a three-year lag
between the last year of RPTA construction included in the dataset (2003) and the
measures taken on the outcome indicators (2006).

4.5.1.1 Private Investment & Blight
There are four variables used to measure private investment: approval rate of
home purchase mortgage loan applications (HPMLAAR), number of home purchase
mortgage loan applications (HPMLA), median dollar amount of home purchase
mortgage loan originations (DHPLO), and number of businesses (BIZ). On the surface,
these indicators appear to be primarily measures of economic changes and, indeed, are
used to measure the concept of private investment activity drawn from the Conceptual
Model. However, there is no unanimous measure for blight; Dardia (1998) used vacancy
and poverty rates to measure blight while Bier, et al. (2007) used changes in property
values. Galster, et al. (2005) included a battery of variables in their attempt to find a
small set of robust indicators of neighborhood change, and concluded from their analyses
that the above indicators derived from HMDA data also act as strong proxies for housing
and social dimensions such as vacancy rates, number of female head of households and
neighborhood racial composition. Therefore, these dependent variables act as proxies for
private investment and blight in this study. Moreover, since this study is concerned with
a housing policy and its impact on neighborhoods, measures of private mortgage lending
activity are viewed as particularly salient to this study.
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The first three variables regarding mortgage lending activity were extracted from
the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data and averaged over two years, 2005
and 2006 (see Table 7). HMDA data provide the most accurate picture of mortgage
lending activity at the census-tract level (Galster, et al., 2004). Following
recommendations found in previous research (e.g., Chow & Coulton, 1998; Galster, et
al., 2005) two-year averages were taken from the HMDA data to help control for extreme
variability between years. HPMLA is the median number of home purchase loan
applications by tract, while HPMLAAR is the median approval rate of those applications.
The third variable, DHPLO, is the median dollar value of home purchase loans
originated. The fourth measure of private investment, BIZ, is the mean number of
businesses by tract. Number of businesses is relevant to urban neighborhoods because it
presents one measure of economic growth, which is often viewed as the priority in the
development of public policy (Bartik, 1991). Historically, urban neighborhoods did not
evolve as “bedroom communities” but can often contain business and industry.

4.5.1.2 Crime
Support for including a measure for crime is found in the Cleveland case study on
RPTA conducted by Bier, et al. (2007):
Respondents [Cleveland residents who owned tax-abated property] did not
indicate a willingness to accept reduced property taxes for assuming higher risks
related to crime. There is a clear indication that respondents are as interested in
safe neighborhoods as they are in getting as much house possible for their money.
(p. 44)
In addition, the 2005 study by Galster, et al. found that crime remained a significant
indicator of neighborhood change and is therefore included in this study.
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Crime data should be a consistent and reliable variable to include in any
examination of neighborhoods because they are collected annually, fall under general
uniform categories and can be retrieved at no cost. However, the experience of this
researcher found that accurate crime data are difficult to obtain given the underreporting
of such activity by victims and witnesses, the discretionary nature of such data as they are
recorded by law enforcement officers, as well as different reasons that can motivate
police officers to underreport crime (see Maier, 1999). Indeed, of all the data gathered
for this dissertation from several different governmental entities, the potential for human
error in constructing a data set is possibly highest for crime data. The researcher could
not obtain 2001 crime data for Columbus because the Columbus Police Department had
yet to fully computerize such information at that time, and the 2006 crime data for the
City of Toledo is inaccurate and incomplete. Therefore, the analysis of crime consists of
the cities of Cleveland and Dayton, and results will be reported with limitations of such a
small sample size in mind. Although, posttest data were available for the city of
Columbus, there are too few observations to run a posttest only analysis of crime for the
city. Crime is divided into two categories, Type I and Type II crimes, as described in
Chapter III. In addition to the raw number of crimes variables, additional analyses were
run using these variables standardized by 2000 population in order to obtain a measure of
crimes per capita per tract because crime is often measured in terms of rates (per 100,000
population) or per capita.
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4.5.1.3 Equity
The final neighborhood indicator is a ratio of median assessed value to median
sales price for each neighborhood, called an assessment ratio, and is from the work of
Birch, Sunderman, & Smith (2004), Allen & Dare (2002), and others (IAAO, 2004).
Ratio values greater than one imply regressive property tax inequity because the property
is being assessed at a higher value than the property is worth in the market, resulting in
the payment of higher property taxes on a property that is of lower value. Ratio values
less than one imply the presence of progressive property tax inequity because the value
used to determine the taxes on the property is less than the value of the property in the
market. A ratio equal to one represents equity because the property is being assessed at
or near its true market value, assuming sales price is an adequate proxy for true market
value. If there appears to be a significant relationship between RPTA and assessment
ratios, depending on the direction of the relationship, then the existence of RPTA units
may be having an impact on the property tax equity of neighborhoods.
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TABLE 7
Dependent Variables: Indicators of Neighborhood Change
Indicator

Definition

Source

HPMLA

Median number of home purchase mortgage loan applications.

HMDA

Median home purchase mortgage loan application approval rate.

HMDA

Median dollar amount of home purchase mortgage loans.

HMDA

Mean number of new businesses.

ES202

Type I Crimes

Violent crimes (homicide, rape, robbery and aggravated
assaults) and property crimes (burglary, larceny-theft, auto theft
and arson).

City Police Depts.;
NEO CANDO

Type II Crimes

Everything not listed in Type I Crimes such as non-aggravated
assaults, forgery, fraud, embezzlement, receiving stolen
property, weapons and drug violations, vandalism, prostitution,
family offenses, and all others.

City Police Depts.;
NEO CANDO

Median Assessed Value / Median Sales Price.

County Treasurers
& County Auditors

HPMLAAR
DHPLO
BIZ

Assessment
Ratio

All of these indicators serve to quantifiably measure outcomes hypothesized to
have significant statistical relationships with the public policy under examination. If
RPTA policy is indeed an effective neighborhood development policy, then we should
see statistically significant changes in the trajectories of the neighborhood indicators for
tracts in the subject group that are not seen in the comparison group.

4.5.2 Independent Variable
Given that the purpose of the proposed study is to uncover the relationship
between RPTA and a set of neighborhood indicators, RPTA is specified and entered into
the statistical model as an independent variable. RPTA represents the number of RPTA
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single-, two- and three-family newly constructed units in a census tract from the first
entry in the information provided by the respective public sector department up through
2003. Table 8 provides the various sources from which the independent variable was
collected.

Table 8
Independent Variable
Variable
RPTA

Definition

Source

Number of single-, two-, and three
new construction residential
properties with tax abatement.

Columbus Dept. of Community Development;
Cuyahoga County Auditor’s Office; Dayton Dept. of
Planning & Community Development; Toledo Dept.
of Development

The variable is given the value of zero for each observation in the comparison
group. RPTA is also entered into the model in squared and cubic forms to help uncover
any threshold effects. In other words, is there a certain number (i.e., threshold) of taxabated homes needed in a neighborhood before significant change is seen in any of the
dependent variables? Although RPTA can apply to significantly rehabilitated units, only
new construction is included in this study. This choice was a pragmatic one and relates
to the pressure housing developers place on city officials to building more new
construction with claims of positive neighborhood impact. Further, cities vary in their
approaches to rehabilitated properties that differ from new construction in terms of
durations and rates.
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4.5.3 Control Variables
There are four control variables included in the statistical model for this study. The
first variable, Y01, provides a pretest measure of the neighborhood context on a given
indicator. Although the independent variable (RPTA) includes new construction built
prior to 2001, the year of the pretest measures, this variable is included in the model to
give a sense of where the neighborhoods stood in a specific year on each respective
outcome variable. In other words, in order to measure change in an outcome variable,
there needs to be a baseline with which any change in compared. Following the approach
taken by Galster, et al., (2004) a five-year lag between pretest and posttest measures was
chosen. In addition, Columbus did not begin using RPTA until 2001 and data from any
city become less reliable the further back in time one goes. Bivariate analyses revealed
essentially linear relationships between each posttest measure and its pretest.
A second variable was included in the statistical model to control for housing
stock characteristics. Housing value has been used as a reasonable proxy representing
housing stock characteristics and some variation in neighborhoods. Median housing
values were obtained for year 2003 to correspond to the last year that RPTA data were
collected. Median housing values were calculated using 2003 county auditor data.
Assessed housing values are often defined at 35% of the estimated full market value; the
median housing value used in this analysis is the estimated full market value.
The third control variable in the analysis measures the change in job growth
between 2001 and 2006. Change in job growth (i.e., number of jobs) is acting as a proxy
for overall economic health (Galster, et al., 2004a), and corresponds to the five-year lag
between the pretest and posttest measures. This variable was constructed using ES202
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data, a database that includes variables for job growth at the tract level, collected
annually.
The fourth control variable is the number of sheriffs’ sales in 2006 by
neighborhood for each of the four cities. Similar to studies examining foreclosures (e.g.,
Coulton, Mikelbank, & Schramm, 2008; Brasington & Sarama, 2008), sheriffs’ sales are
used as a proxy for foreclosures in this study. Neither the City of Dayton, Montgomery
County Clerk of Courts, or the County Sheriff’s Office could produce any information on
sheriff’s sales for year 2001. The researcher was told that this information is only kept
for two years and then records are deleted. The original variable conceived of to control
for sheriffs’ sales was the change in number of sheriffs’ sales between 2001 and 2006.
However, since Dayton could not provide any 2001 data, and there were many missing
values for this variable for 2001 in the other three cities, the researcher decided that the
best use of this information given the imperfect data collection was to use the number of
sheriffs’ sales for 2006 as the control variable in the model. Further, the original scope of
this project did not include a variable for foreclosures. However, after discussion during
the prospectus presentation, the researcher agreed that a control variable for foreclosures
would be prudent given that rates of foreclosure in Ohio’s cities are at crisis levels. An
independent samples t-test was conducted to determine whether the number of sheriffs’
sales was significantly different between subject and comparison groups. Results
indicate that there was a significant difference between subject and comparison groups (t
= -2.142, p < .05) for the number of sheriff’s sales in 2001. Therefore, a variable was
included in the analysis to control for sheriffs’ sales, given the current foreclosure crisis
affecting Ohio’s urban neighborhoods. The final control variable included in the analysis
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is a dummy variable to control for any variation seen in outcome indicators that is
significantly related to a given city. Table 9 provides a summary of the control variables
included in this analysis.

Table 9
Control Variables
Variable

Measure

Sources

2001 value for outcome indicator in neighborhood i

HMDA; ES202; City Police
Depts.; County Treasurers;
and Auditors; NEOCANDO

MHV

Median housing value, 2003

MGLCUA Housing Center;
County Auditors

ΔJG

Percent change in jobs 2001 to 2006 for neighborhood i

ES202

Number of sheriffs’ sales in 2006 for neighborhood i

County Auditors;
Montgomery Co. Sheriff’s
Office & Clerk of Courts;
MGLCUA Housing Center

Dummy variable for Columbus, Cleveland, Dayton

N/A

Y01

SS

CITY

Performing a similar analysis as the national level would generate the need to
control for regional changes and indeed Galster, et al. (2004) was pulling from a national
sample of cities and therefore stratified their sample into four categories based upon
region. Such stratification proved to be unwarranted in this study and, given the
relatively small sample size, there are degrees of freedom to be considered.
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4.6 Data Collection
Several public agencies and universities in the four cities were contacted over
several months in attempts to acquire the various data needed for this project. In the
summer of 2008, the researcher visited the cities in the study, met with the public
administrator(s) in charge of the respective city’s RPTA program, began her data
collection efforts, and was given guided tours of one or more neighborhoods with RPTA.
Data on RPTA program dimensions including the date of home construction was given to
the researcher by these administrators. For the City of Cleveland, however, the contact
person was unsure of how long it would take her to complete the request. Therefore, the
same request was made to the Tax Incentive Review Council in the Office of the
Cuyahoga County Auditor, who fulfilled the request. The data were converted from either
address or parcel number to census tract level. These data of the location and date of the
number of newly-constructed single- and two-family residential units that have property
tax abatement (RPTA) were used to construct the independent variable.
The first three dependent variables regarding mortgages were taken from Home
Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data provided by the Mandel School of Applied
Social Sciences Center on Urban Poverty and Community Development at Case Western
Reserve University. The fourth dependent variable, number of businesses, and the
control variable for percent change in jobs were drawn from the Quarterly Census of
Employment and Wages (ES202) from the Ohio Department of Jobs & Family Services.
These data were compiled by the Center for Economic Development at the Maxine
Goodman Levin College of Urban Affairs at Cleveland State University, and were
provided at the census tract level for the four cities in the analysis. For the crime data
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used in this analysis, data comprising the fifth (Type I Crimes), sixth (Type II Crimes)
and seventh (Property Crimes) dependent variables were collected through the Columbus
and Dayton Police Departments for those respective cities. Crime data for the City of
Cleveland was retrieved from NEO CANDO, the database website maintained by the
Mandel School of Applied Social Sciences Center on Urban Poverty and Community
Development at Case Western Reserve University, which receives the data from the
Cleveland Police Department. The researcher confirmed with the Cleveland Police
Department that the data retrieved from NEO CANDO are the same data one would
receive from a public records request through the department. The advantage to
retrieving data from NEO CANDO is that the data can be retrieved at census tract level.
The final dependent variable is a ratio of assessed values to sales values for
residential property. For the cities of Columbus, Dayton and Toledo, a public records
request was submitted to the respective county auditors, each of whom fulfilled the data
request with a monetary charge varying from $1 to $50. The data were converted from
parcel level to census tract level using GIS. For the City of Cleveland, sales and
assessment data were compiled by The Center for Housing Research and Policy at the
Maxine Goodman Levin College of Urban Affairs at Cleveland State University at the
census tract level.
Sales data for 2001 and 2006 were collected from the Franklin County Auditor’s
Office for the City of Columbus, the Lucas County Auditor’s Office for the City of
Toledo, the Montgomery County Sheriff’s Office and Clerk of Courts for the City of
Dayton, and The Center for Housing Research & Policy at the Maxine Goodman Levin
College of Urban Affairs at Cleveland State University for the City of Cleveland. For the
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City of Dayton, only 2006 data were available. The researcher was awarded funding that
covered the costs of data gathering through the Albert A. and Maxine Goodman Levin
Advisory Fund to assist in her data collection pursuits.

4.7 Data Analysis
The SPSS statistical software package was used. The first step in the analysis
involved the examination of bivariate scatterplots for each pretest and posttest measure;
the relationships were essentially linear. Second, independence of samples tests were run
on pretest measures to determine comparability between subject and comparison groups
as described previously. The third step of analysis is the presentation of some descriptive
statistics regarding the data.

This stage is to help familiarize the reader with the data by

presenting summary statistics and distributions of the variables.
The final stage involves a multiple regression analysis designed to uncover any
significant statistical relationships between RPTA and the several indicators of
neighborhood change and the direction of those relationships controlling for city,
economic growth, housing stock characteristics, and foreclosures by neighborhood. A
cubic regression model was run based upon previous research and may help to uncover a
threshold at which the level of RPTA homes reaches a statistically significant relationship
with a given neighborhood indicator. This analysis is exploratory in nature and, as such,
no strict interpretations of regression coefficients will be made.
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CHAPTER V
DATA ANALYSIS

5.1 Introduction
This chapter presents results from the analyses performed on each of the seven
dependent variables as they relate to the presence of newly-constructed residential units
that received property tax abatements. Specifically, this chapter will discuss the strength
and direction of any relationships between the dependent variables and any of the
independent and control variables in the model as hypothesized in Chapter III.
Hypotheses were crafted from the perspective of the policy maker and city official in that
RPTA is a policy effort to revitalize urban neighborhoods and retain and/or attract
middle- and upper-income homeowners to neighborhoods and cities that have seen these
groups relocate to suburban areas.
First there is a brief discussion of the results of the hypothesis testing. Second, a
discussion of the independent and dependent variables will be presented. Third, model
summaries from testing the usefulness of a chosen statistical model for analyzing
residential tax abatement policy will be presented and discussed. Finally, answers to the
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initial research questions of this study will be presented. Namely, are there statistically
significant relationships between residential property tax abatement and a chosen set of
neighborhood indicators? Further, is there a certain number of newly-constructed RPTA
units (a threshold) at which one sees significant relationships between RPTA and
indicators of neighborhood change?

5.2 Summary Results of Hypothesis Testing
The researcher found only one discernable relationship between the subject group
and an indicator of neighborhood change—Type II crimes (H6)—even after controlling
for the current foreclosure crisis in Ohio’s urban neighborhoods, job growth, housing
stock characteristics, and the city. The presence of RPTA homes was significantly
related to Type II crimes, and the relationship was in the expected direction. One fails to
reject the null hypotheses for the remaining six neighborhood indicators. Table 10
provides a summary of the hypothesis test results for each specific null hypothesis.
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Table 10
Summary of Hypothesis Test Results for Indicators of Neighborhood Change
Hypothesis

p < .05

NH1

RPTA is not significantly related to home
purchase mortgage loan approval rates.

Fail to reject null

NH2

RPTA is not significantly related to the
number of home purchase mortgage loan
applications.

Fail to reject null

NH3

RPTA is not significantly related to the
median dollar amount of home purchase
mortgage loans originated.

Fail to reject null

NH4

RPTA is not significantly related to the
number of businesses.

Fail to reject null

NH5

RPTA is not significantly related to Type I
crimes.

Fail to reject null

NH6

RPTA is not significantly related to Type II
crimes.

Reject the null

NH7

RPTA is not significantly related to
assessment ratios.

Fail to reject null

5.3 Preliminary Analysis of Independent Variable
The measure of the independent variable, RPTA, was the number of newlyconstructed single-, two- and three-family tax-abated units in each census tract, from as
early as 1987 through 2003. The starting date for implementation of RPTA programs
varied from city to city, with Toledo reporting the earliest RPTA homes in its dataset
(1987). Following the structure laid out in Galster, et al. (2004), a three-year lag between
the completion of RPTA homes and the measurement of changes in the neighborhood
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indicators was incorporated into the model. It is assumed that there is a lag between the
completion of housing construction and any changes seen in the neighborhood as a result
of these investments. In the comparison group observations, RPTA is given a value of
zero. Standardizing the independent variable for RPTA was considered but not justified
by theory, the literature or legislation. Initially it was considered that number of RPTA
homes should be standardized by some overall neighborhood characteristic such as
median number of households or population by tract. However, there is no standard by
which areas with RPTA are created. For example the policy does not have any
population requirements for a proposed area, but merely requires that investment has
been discouraged.
Galster et al. (2004) did not find significant relationships when using median
CDBG spending for their full sample of census tracts or even when they standardized
CDBG spending per poor resident, per tract. “Results changed dramatically when we
confined our analysis to those tracts evincing above-sample-average CDBG spending”
(2004, p. 915). Following this logic, this study focused on a sample of tracts that had
sixteen or more RPTA units, i.e., those tracts with above-sample-average number of
RPTA units. Even with this confined sample (n=59), there were no statistically
significant relationships between number of RPTA new construction and any indicators
of neighborhood change (p < 0.05). Moreover, confining the sample in this way resulted
in the exclusion of any Columbus neighborhoods and a preponderance of Cleveland
census tracts comprising the sample (n=45, over 76%).
The comparison group used in this study is comprised of those census tracts
contiguous to census tracts with new construction residential tax-abated properties.

109

Tracts contiguous to RPTA tracts were determined to be a reasonable comparison group
as presented in Chapter IV. Table 11 lists the number of tracts for each city included in
the analysis, by group. This information is also represented in Figures A1-A4 of the
Appendix, which are maps highlighting the subject and comparison groups for each city
included in the analysis. There were thirteen contiguous tracts removed from the
comparison groups for the city of Cleveland for a variety of reasons. Some of the tracts
lacked housing and/or mortgage data, while other tracts had zero population and missing
data. One subject group tract was removed for the city of Toledo because of scant data.
No tracts were removed from either group for Columbus or Dayton.
Table 11
Number of Tracts in Subject and Comparison Groups by City
Subject Group
Tracts

Comparison Group
Tracts

Total

Cleveland

159

51

210

Columbus

8

37

45

Dayton

10

20

30

Toledo

28

24

52

TOTAL

205

132

337

City

5.4 Descriptive Statistics of the Dependent Variables
Table 12 provides information about the distribution of the dependent variables.
This information is important in understanding why assumptions regarding the
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interpretation of the regression coefficients, as well as the ability to make causal
inferences about relationships between RPTA and the given neighborhood indicators are
not applicable to this analysis because no assumptions are made about the distribution of
the variables or their corresponding error terms. Looking at the table of descriptive
statistics, a majority of the dependent variables are not skewed, but there are high levels
of kurtosis, especially in the comparison group. This study was not based on a random
sample; repeating the study with a large number of samples would yield normally
distributed sample means. Included in the Appendix is Table A2, which provides
descriptive statistics for the dependent, independent, and control variables.
Table 12
Descriptive Statistics of Dependent Variables by Group
SUBJECT HPMLAAR

HPMLA

DHPLO

BIZ

Type I

Type II

AV_SP

Valid N

204

203

204

203

177

175

200

Missing

1

2

1

2

28

30

5

Mean

.479

77.810

80709.559

30.61

180.67

195.86

1.278

Std. Error
of Mean

.008

3.868

2107.702

2.006

8.707

8.967

.0284

Median

.470

75.500

77625.000

21.50

161.00

177.00

1.224

SD

.112

55.106

30104.005

28.584

115.842

118.622

.402

Variance

.013

3036.703

9.063E8

817.043

13419.462

14071.062

.162

Skewness

-.749

.921

1.931

2.248

2.264

1.339

.337

SE of
Skewness

.170

.171

.170

.171

.183

.184

.172

Kurtosis

5.464

.955

8.528

6.918

8.331

2.887

1.385

Std. Error
of Kurtosis

.339

.340

.339

.340

.363

.365

.342
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Range

.92

273.50

258750.00

168

806

752

2.63

Minimum

.00

.00

.00

1

3

3

.00

Maximum

.92

273.50

258750.00

170

809

755

2.63

Valid N

132

132

131

130

105

105

124

Missing

0

0

1

2

27

27

8

Mean

.486

93.489

78938.93

49.07

210.57

259.72

1.29

Std. Error
of Mean

.011

6.086

4248.56

4.905

14.304

20.266

.0346

Median

.482

89.25

71750.00

32.25

189.00

213.00

1.202

SD

.129

69.926

48626.98

55.931

146.573

207.662

.385

Variance

.017

4889.586

2.365E9

3128.22

21483.632

43123.394

.148

Skewness

-.920

.794

4.203

3.049

1.684

1.383

.642

SE of
Skewness

.211

.211

.212

.212

.236

.236

.217

Kurtosis

4.248

.316

26.223

11.432

4.756

1.928

1.059

Std. Error
of Kurtosis

.419

.419

.420

.422

.467

.467

.431

Range

.81

298.00

433500.00

356

872

974

2.32

Minimum

.00

1.00

.00

0

12

8

.22

Maximum

.81

299.00

433500.00

356

884

982

COMP.

5.5 Model Results
This section will discuss the outcomes of testing the cubic regression model
presented in Galster, et al. (2004) as a useful tool for uncovering relationships between
RPTA and a set of indicators of neighborhood change that were derived from the
literature and from legislation, and discussed at length in previous chapters.
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The results

will be presented as they relate to the conceptual model. The results regarding changes in
neighborhood private investment and blight are presented first, followed by a discussion
of RPTA and its relation to crime levels. Lastly, results regarding the measure of
property tax equity will be presented and discussed. The design of this study was chosen
to present a counter-factual scenario regarding RPTA; namely, the research design
included a comparison group in order to present what would happen in a neighborhood if
there were no new tax-abated homes. Differences between the subject and comparison
groups will be discussed for each dependent variable.
It should be made clear at the outset of this discussion that this analysis is probative in
nature and attempts to uncover the strength and direction of relationships between the
dependent variables and the independent variable of interest, RPTA. For reasons
discussed in the previous section regarding errors with the data, no interpretation of the
effects on the margin as reflected in the regression coefficients will be included in this
analysis. Table A3 and A4 in the Appendix list the coefficients and standard errors for
those relationships significant at p < .05 for both subject and comparison groups.

5.5.1 Private Investment & Blight
The first three variables chosen to represent private investment activity and blight
were derived to test the usefulness of a tested and published set of such indicators from
the work of Galster et al. (2004; 2005) and from the legislation regarding the policy.
These three variables are tested measures of mortgage and mortgage lending activity in
neighborhoods. The first dependent variable chosen from this previous study is used in
this analysis as a way to measure private investment activity: median home purchase
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mortgage loan approval rates (HPMLAAR) averaged over two years (2005 and 2006).
Median values averaged over two years were chosen to help control for known variability
in HMDA data (Galster, 2004). This variable helps to measure private investment
activity by gauging the willingness of lenders to invest in local residential markets.
It was hypothesized (H1) that the presence of RPTA homes in a neighborhood is
significantly and positively related to home purchase mortgage loan approval rates. In
other words, as the number of RPTA homes increased in a neighborhood the HPMLAAR
also would increase and that there would be no significant change in this indicator for
neighborhoods in the comparison group. A one-tailed test was employed because theory
indicates that the expected direction of the relationship between RPTA and mortgage loan
approval rates should be positive. The researcher failed to reject the null hypothesis NH1
that there is no significant relationship between RPTA and home purchase mortgage loan
approval rates.
For the subject group, only two control variables were significantly related to the
dependent variable at p < .05: the pretest variable controlling for loan approval rates in
2001 and the constant, which reflects the base category of the dummy variable for city
which, in all cases, is Cleveland (Table A3, Appendix). In the comparison group, all
control variables except change in job growth were significantly related to HPMLAAR at
p < .05 (Table A4, Appendix). In essence, there does not appear to be a statistically
significant discernable relationship between this particular measure of private investment
and the presence of tax-abated homes. Table 13 presents the cubic regression model
summary for this neighborhood change indicator. Both groups appear to have a relatively
strong linear relationship between the observed values of HPMLAAR and the predicted
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values of the model. Approximately thirty-five to forty percent of the variation in
HPMLAAR is explained by the model.
Table 13
Model Summary of Outcome Variable HPMLAAR
Group

N

R

R Square

Adjusted R
Square

Std. Error of
the Estimate

Subject

202

.599

.359

.325

.09226

Comparison

120

.628

.395

.357

.07331

The second measure using HMDA data represents blight, and is the median
number of home purchase mortgage loan applications (HPMLA), averaged for 2005 and
2006. This variable is a measure of the demand for new housing purchases in an area and
is therefore a gauge for blight, assuming that increased home purchase loan applications
for new construction is an indicator of positive physical change in an area. The
hypothesis presented in Chapter III is that RPTA will be significantly related to HPMLA
and that this relationship will be positive. In essence, as the number of RPTA homes
increase in a neighborhood the number of home purchase mortgage loan applications
would increase as well, and that there would be no significant change in this indicator for
neighborhoods comprising the comparison group. The researcher failed to reject the null
hypothesis NH2. RPTA is not related to the number of home purchase mortgage loan
applications (p < .05).
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However, the cubed variable presented a relationship at a significance level of
p < .10, and the direction of the relationship was positive (Table A3, Appendix). This
result can be interpreted as evidence that there may be a level at which a high number of
RPTA homes in a neighborhood may be related to HPMLA. Intuitively and logically this
relationship makes sense because as a neighborhood reaches a point where there is a very
large amount of new residential property for sale (i.e., RPTA3), one should expect the
number of mortgage loan applications to increase, possibly significantly, assuming there
is demand for the housing. What is interesting about this finding is that, even though the
number of mortgage loan applications shows a significant and positive relationship with
RPTA, the first variable measuring private investment (HPMLAAR) was not
significantly related, even at a threshold level. In essence, if a significant number of
mortgage loan applications to buy these newly-constructed tax abated units are not
approved, then how well does such an outcome bode for neighborhoods suffering from
disinvestment? A relationship may not exist between the supply of home financing
being made available in these neighborhoods and consumers willing to invest. While this
question is not addressed in this study per se, it has policy implications that will be
discussed in Chapter VI.
For both subject and comparison groups it was found that median housing value,
number of 2006 sheriffs’ sales, and the pretest measure of HPMLA in 2001 was each
related to the outcome variable at p < .05 (Tables A3 & A4 in Appendix). A distinction
between the two groups arises regarding the role of the city in each model. For the
comparison group representing the counter-factual scenario, only Columbus had a
significant association with the number of home purchase loan applications in 2006.
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However Columbus, Dayton and Toledo were significantly associated with HPMLA for
the subject group. This result implies localized effects in the way RPTA is administered
in these cities; all three cities designate areas to receive RPTA, while Cleveland
administers the program citywide. Table 14 presents the model summary on this
outcome variable of interest. Both groups appear to have a relatively strong linear
relationship between the observed values of HPMLA and the predicted values of the
model, and the model explains between 76 and 88 percent of the variation in HPMLA,
ceteris paribus.

Table 14
Model Summary of Outcome Variable HPMLA
Group

N

R

R Square

Adjusted R
Square

Std. Error of
the Estimate

Subject

202

.940

.883

.877

98.2806

Comparison

120

.874

.764

.750

34.4424

The third variable measures both private investment and blight in that it gauges
how much lenders are willing to invest in an area on average, and also with how much
mortgage debt homeowners are willing to burden themselves. This variable is the median
dollar amount of home purchase mortgage loans originated (DHPLO), averaged for 2005
and 2006. It was hypothesized that RPTA would be significantly related to DHPLO, and
that the direction of this relationship would be positive. In other words, as the number of
RPTA homes increased in a neighborhood the median dollar amount of home purchase
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loans originated would increase, but there would be no significant change in DHPLO in
the neighborhoods comprising the comparison group. The results of this analysis on the
outcome variable DHPLO indicate a failure to reject null hypothesis NH3. RPTA is not
significantly related to the median dollar amount of home purchase mortgage loans
originated. For the subject group, the variables controlling for city, the pretest, and the
number of sheriffs’ sales were significant at p < .05. For the comparison group, only the
constant term (Cleveland) held a significant relationship with the outcome variable.
Table 15 presents the model summary for the dependent variable DHPLO. The subject
group appears to be a better fit to the model than the comparison group, with fifty-three
percent variation in median dollar amounts of home loans originated explained by the
model.

Table 15
Model Summary of Outcome Variable DHPLO
Group

N

R

R Square

Adjusted R
Square

Std. Error of
the Estimate

Subject

202

.730

.532

.508

21206.374

Comparison

119

.403

.162

.110

39761.813

The fourth dependent variable in this analysis is a measure of change in private
investment in urban neighborhoods and is the mean number of businesses in 2006 (BIZ)
and used herein as a robust and parsimonious measure of neighborhood change (Galster,
et al., 2004; 2005). It was hypothesized that RPTA was significantly related to the
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number of businesses and that this relationship was positive. In essence, as the number
of RPTA homes increase in a neighborhood, the number of businesses would
significantly increase and that there would be no significant change in number of
businesses in the neighborhoods comprising the comparison group. One fails to reject
null hypothesis NH4; RPTA is not significantly related to the number of businesses.
Table 16 presents the model summary for this outcome variable. Both subject and
comparison group models are a good fit to the data because of the strength of association
between the pretest variable (mean number of businesses in 2001) and the 2006 measure
for both the subject and comparison groups (Tables 3A & 4A in Appendix). This strong
association between the pretest and posttest variables makes sense in that the number of
businesses at the neighborhood level may change more slowly over time than the fiveyear lag between measurements employed in this study. The variable controlling for
median housing values was significantly related to the number of businesses for the
subject group, and the dummy variable for Toledo was significantly associated with
number of businesses in both groups.

Table 16
Model Summary of Outcome Variable Mean Number of Businesses
Group

N

R

R Square

Adjusted R
Square

Std. Error of
the Estimate

Subject

201

.983

.986

.985

5.412

Comparison

119

.993

.966

.964

6.853
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5.5.2 Crime
The variable for crime proposed earlier for this study was adapted from an article
by Chow and Coulton (1998) and was defined as the total number of homicide, rape,
robbery, assault, aggravated assault, burglary, auto theft and larceny per capita.
However, further investigation into the literature on broken windows (e.g., Corman &
Mocan, 2005) and in the ways in which other sources organize the data (e.g., NEO
CANDO) reveal that lumping all crimes into one large category may miss a significant
distinction mentioned in some of the literature that tests the broken windows hypothesis.
The logic of the argument is that crimes such as homicide and aggravated assault are a
few more steps removed from (and therefore harder to link directly to) “broken windows”
than are theft and non-aggravated assaults, ceteris paribus. So, as discussed and defined
in Chapter III, the original indicator of neighborhood change representing crime in
neighborhoods has been divided into two separate indicators: Type I and Type II crimes,
measured in 2006. Results from the separate analyses run on each type will be discussed.
It should be kept in mind that the sample size was diminished, with only two of the four
cities included in the analysis.
The first variable measuring crime, Type I crimes, includes violent crimes and
property crimes as delineated by the Mandel School of Social Sciences at Case Western
Reserve University, and discussed previously. The hypothesis presented was that RPTA
was significantly related to Type I crimes and that this was an inverse relationship. In
other words, a significant increase in the number of RPTA homes in urban neighborhoods
is associated with a significant decrease in the number of Type I crimes, and that there

120

would be no significant change in number of Type I crimes in the neighborhoods
comprising the comparison group for the time period.
One fails to reject null hypothesis NH5. This finding is contrary to the finding of
Giacopassi and Forde (2000), who found a link between homicide and traffic fatality
rates in their empirical analysis of the theory of broken windows. Table 17 presents the
model summary for this outcome variable; tables for Type I crimes per capita (total
number of crimes divided by population, per tract) are presented in Table 5A in the
Appendix. Similar to the strong pretest-posttest association found with the number of
businesses, the pretest measure of Type I crimes in 2001 was significantly related to the
outcome variable and helps explain the high r-square value for both subject and
comparison groups.
Table 17
Model Summary of Outcome Variable Number of Type I Crimes
Group

N

R

R Square

Adjusted R
Square

Std. Error of
the Estimate

Subject

166

.919

.844

.836

41.368

Comparison

62

.959

.921

.913

43.152

The second variable measuring crime is Type II crimes, and represents lesser
criminal offenses. The hypothesis stated in Chapter III is that RPTA is significantly
related to Type II crimes, and that these variables were inversely related. One rejects null
hypothesis NH6 at p < .05; there appears to be a statistically significant relationship
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between the number of RPTA homes in a neighborhoods and the number of Type II
crimes, ceteris paribus. The direction of the relationship was also expected, with the
number of Type II crimes decreasing as number of RPTA homes increased. This
relationship disappears when the analysis is run with Type II crime per capita, the
summary of which is in Table 6A in the Appendix. The significant association between
this indicator of neighborhood change and RPTA should be interpreted with caution
given the relatively small sample sizes comprised of data for only two cities (Cleveland
and Dayton). Both the number of sheriffs’ sales in 2006 and the pretest measure of Type
II crimes in 2001 were significantly related to Type II crimes in 2006. In addition,
variables controlling for city were significant for the subject group. Model summary
results comparing subject and comparison groups in this outcome variable are presented
in Table 18. Similar to Type I crimes, there is a high goodness-of-fit statistic primarily
due to the pretest measure being highly correlated with the posttest measure.

Table 18
Model Summary of Outcome Variable Number of Type II Crimes
Group

N

R

R Square

Adjusted R
Square

Std. Error of
the Estimate

Subject

165

.822

.851

.843

45.605

Comparison

62

.961

.923

.916

56.569
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5.5.3 Equity
The final variable in the analysis is a measure of equity and is the median
assessed value-to-sales price ratios for each census tract. Assessed values were pulled
from the data for each residential property for pretest year 2001 and posttest year 2006.
In some cities the assessed value is equal to thirty-five percent of the estimated market
value. In other cities, the assessed value is presented as the estimated full market value.
For this study, the estimated full market value was used as the assessed value. All
property transfers are included in the data resulting in many cases where transfers took
place but no money was exchanged; these transfers have a zero as the sales amount and
were removed from the analysis. All sales amounts with a value greater than zero were
used in calculating the denominator of the ratio. The median assessment ratio was
calculated for each census tract.
In examining vertical tax equity issues, one is observing the difference between
homes in one stratum with homes in another stratum. In this case, the delineation is
between assessment ratios for neighborhoods with RPTA and those without tax-abated
units. In essence, the question in whether cities practice systematic inequitable
assessment of properties in neighborhoods without RPTA a way to “make up” the loss of
property tax revenues from tax abated properties. Specifically, is there a statistically
significant relationship between the number of RPTA units in a neighborhood and
assessment ratios. City officials do not want RPTA to be associated with any change in
the assessment ratios because that would imply that the governmental administration of
the property assessment process is systematically skewed (i.e., unfair).
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One fails to reject the null hypothesis NH7; RPTA and assessment ratios are not
statistically significantly related at p < .05.

Only the number of sheriffs’ sales and all

four cities had significant relationships with the equity measure for the subject group.
These significant associations differed for the comparison group (pretest, median housing
value, Cleveland, and Dayton). However, the cubed RPTA variable presented a
relationship at a significance level of p < .10, and the direction of the relationship was
negative. The researcher cautiously interprets this result as evidence that there may be a
level at which a high number of RPTA homes in a neighborhood may be related to
changes in the assessment ratios. The negative direction of the relationship is interesting;
either the assessment of new residential properties is more accurate (i.e., closer to the
sales value) than for older properties, or the process systematically under-assesses new
residential construction. An answer to this question is beyond the scope of this study but
worth further inquiry. Table 19 provides a summary of the cubic regression model on
this neighborhood indicator. The model appears to fit the data for both groups
adequately, ceteris paribus.

Table 19
Model Summary for Outcome Variable Assessment Ratios, 2006
Group

N

R

R Square

Adjusted R
Square

Std. Error of
the Estimate

Subject

193

.636

.405

.372

.307

Comparison

116

.709

.503

.471

.275
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An additional finding when examining the descriptive statistics for the dependent
variable is that the assessment ratios vary considerably from 2001 to 2006, with an overassessment of 2006 residential property values across both subject and comparison
neighborhoods. Indeed, 2001 assessment ratios reveal under-assessment of property
values, with assessment ratios of less than one for 82.7% of the 323 tracts included in the
analysis for which data were available. Conversely, 2006 assessment ratios reach a level
of over-assessment (where the value is greater than one) at 21.6% of the 324 tracts for
which data were available. In other words, less than 20% of homes in the sample tracts
in 2001 had an increased property tax burden, while in 2006 nearly 80% of the homes
were being taxed at a higher-than-market rate. Paired samples t-tests (Tables 19 and 20)
reveal that the mean difference between 2001 and 2006 assessment ratios for both groups
is significant.
Table 20
Paired Samples Statistics for Assessment Ratios by Group, 2001 and 2006
Group

Variable

Mean

N

SD

SE Mean

Subject

Assess. ratio_01

0.870

195

.255

.018

Assess. ratio_06

1.287

195

.386

.028

Assess. ratio_01

0.847

120

.144

.013

Assess. ratio_06

1.305

120

.380

.035

Comparison
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Table 21
Paired Differences for Assessment Ratios by Group, 2001 and 2006
Group

Variable

Mean

SD

SE
Mean

t

Sig. (2tailed)

Subject

Assess. ratio_01
Assess. ratio_06

-.417

.428

.031

-13.595

.000

Comparison

Assess. ratio_01
Assess. ratio_06

-.458

.368

.034

-13.647

.000

5.6 Conclusion
Three aspects of RPTA programs with important policy implications were examined
in this study regarding the role of residential property tax abatement and its possible
relationship with changes on a set of neighborhood indicators. The first question of
whether there are statistically significant relationships between residential property tax
abatement policy and any of a set of indicators of change in Ohio’s urban neighborhoods
is a qualified no, with evidence of only one statistically significant relationship between
RPTA and the respective dependent variables at p < .05. The second issue is derived
from the first, and posited that there may be a certain point at which the number of RPTA
units is large enough to generate a significant relationship between this threshold and any
indicators of neighborhood change. There appears to be no level at which the number of
RPTA homes is significantly associated with any of the indicators of neighborhood
change. The third aspect of this study presented a counterfactual scenario by running the
same analysis on a comparison group of census tracts in order to uncover any significant
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differences between it and the subject group. Comparison of tracts with RPTA and those
without such homes did not yield significant differences between the two groups.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1 Answering the Research Question
Using a tested statistical model and set of indicators of neighborhood change
(Galster, et al., 2004; 2005), the purpose of this study was to find evidence of any
discernable relationships between new construction residential property tax abatement
(RPTA) and a set of indicators of neighborhood change. These indicators were drawn
from the Ohio legislation and the academic literature. The indicators attempting to
examine changes in private investment and blight were determined to be useful to
“summarily track[ed] key dimensions of neighborhoods” (Galster, et al., 2004, p. 265).
The indicators for crime were chosen to test the broken windows hypothesis (e.g., Wilson
& Kelling, 1982), and changes in assessment ratios were chosen as a measure of vertical
property tax equity (Cornia & Slade, 2005; IAAO, 2004). The comparison group
representing the counter-factual scenario was comprised of contiguous census tracts for
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which data could be gathered and that did not have RPTA units at the time of the study
period.
The research question is whether there are significant statistical relationships
between residential property tax abatement (RPTA) and changes in urban neighborhoods
as measured on a set of indicators, and the direction of those relationships. The answer is
no, there were no significant statistical relationships between RPTA and six of the seven
indicators of neighborhood change. There was one significant association in the expected
direction between RPTA and Type II crimes, but this relationship was not tight given the
small sample size drawn from only two cities. In essence, no neighborhood effects were
found as defined in this study.
Another possible result from the analysis would be to discover a threshold at
which the number of RPTA homes in a neighborhood reaches a point where one sees
significant changes in the outcome indicators by examining the level of significance of
the square and the cube of the independent variable. No such threshold was found at
p < .05 for any of the indicators of neighborhood change, but the cubed independent
variable was significantly related to the number of home purchase mortgage loan
applications at p < .10. However, this result is not surprising given that a huge increase
in the supply of newly constructed homes in an area would be significantly associated
with an increase in the number of loan applications to buy these homes.
A well-matched comparison group was incorporated into the research design to
represent a counter-factual scenario: were it not for RPTA, would the neighborhood
trajectories have remained the same? Not necessarily. While subject and comparison
groups appeared to be similar to each other based upon six of the seven pretest measures,
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there were significant differences between the subject and comparison groups on posttest
measures, suggesting that the subject group and the control group may indeed be on
different trajectories of change. However, this study provides evidence that these
different trajectories of change are not related to the number of RPTA homes in these
urban neighborhoods.
In addition, no one city stood out as having significantly different relationships
between its indicators of neighborhood change and the independent or control variables.
This finding is important given that the cities of Columbus and Dayton target their RPTA
programs to small geographic areas, Toledo includes a much larger area, and Cleveland’s
RPTA program is citywide (Figures A1-A4 in the Appendix). This finding also runs
counter to conclusions reached in the literature about the effectiveness of targeting tax
incentive program to smaller geographic areas (e.g., Sands, Reese and Khan, 2006).
Following a similar approach in Galster, et al. (2004), no discernable relationships
were found when the sample was stratified by those tracts with number of RPTA homes
above the mean (greater than 15.56). Therefore the follow-up question regarding the
direction of the relationship was rendered moot. There was a suggestion of a threshold at
p < .10, where a certain large number of RPTA homes must be constructed before one
starts to see significant change in two of the neighborhood indicators, the number of
home purchase mortgage loan applications and lesser criminal offenses (Type II crimes).
These results mirror the results found in the non-stratified sample.
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6.2 Results of Analysis and Theoretical Concepts
The design of this dissertation took the result of a public policy focused on
neighborhoods — the building of new tax-abated homes—and compared a sample of
neighborhoods where the policy was in operation with a sample of neighborhoods where
there was no policy operating during the period under study. The dependent variables
were each related to notions of neighborhood change. These indicators represented both
constructs in the conceptual model (Figure 1 in Chapter III) and desired policy outcomes
that were to ultimately change neighborhood context for the better. In essence,
residential property tax abatement (RPTA) was to be related to desirable changes in local
housing markets, local economies, and social and physical conditions of the
neighborhood. In addition, there were five theoretical branches outlined in this
dissertation and represented in its conceptual model that support the exploration of the
relationship between RPTA and neighborhood change. As discussed previously, these
branches were derived from the academic literature, state and local legislation, and the
political debate surrounding residential property tax abatement.
It appears that RPTA is having a desirable impact for cities regarding the first
theoretical branch, inter-jurisdictional competition (IJC). The positive relationship
between the number of home purchase mortgage loan applications and the number of
RPTA homes in a neighborhood implies that there is demand for homes in urban
neighborhoods with RPTA. However, this conclusion makes an assumption that the loan
applicants are not just drawn from a population making intra-city moves. Bier, et al.
(2007) argue that even if these moves are within the city, at least urban neighborhoods
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are retaining emerging middle-class families. Such an outcome is noteworthy given the
population loss occurring in older urban areas.
The second branch involved a discussion of some general theories of
neighborhood change such as filtering and gentrification. The idea of filtering as the
notion that aging housing stock is less desirable than new construction is supported by the
results of this analysis, if one assumes that the significant positive change in the median
number of home purchase loan applications in neighborhoods with RPTA is due to the
demand for these newly constructed homes. It may be useful to conduct an analysis
examining the demand for RPTA new construction versus rehabilitation, which also
receives tax incentives. Making any assertions regarding the process of gentrification is
beyond the scope of this study, but a similar analysis could be used to examine the
relationship between RPTA and gentrification. For example, an examination of changes
in median household income, poverty levels and changes in racial composition of
neighborhoods and their possible relationships to the indicators of neighborhood change
could be conducted.
It can be argued that the proposed anti-urban—pro-rural dichotomy is operating
and supported by the study results. RPTA is an offering of a large financial incentive in
order to lure people back to urban neighborhoods, but they are not enough to generate
desirable changes in these neighborhoods. The fact that such incentives are
commonplace speaks to the idea that urban areas are undesirable places to live.
The fourth theory incorporated into this study is the theory of broken windows as
it relates to changes in crime. This study lends support to the broken windows hypothesis
that improving physical conditions of an area through the construction of RPTA homes
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will have an impact on the number of lesser (Type II) crimes reported to police, ceteris
paribus. However, there was not a significant relationship between improving physical
conditions through RPTA and more serious criminal offenses. A more comprehensive
examination of any relationships between crime and RPTA was beyond the scope of this
study, but warrants further investigation to try and uncover the relationship between
urban redevelopment efforts and Type I and Type II crimes. As discussed in Chapter V,
the support is very weak due to incomplete and missing data.
The final theoretical branch is concerned with the idea of equitable distribution,
specifically regarding the property tax burden. The results of this study do not support
the assertion of RPTA policy opponents that there is a significant relationship between an
increase in the number of RPTA homes and an increase in vertical property tax inequity
(as measured by median assessment ratios) in the subject group. Instead, there appears to
be a systematic over-assessment of properties for 2006 across both subject and
comparison groups (see Tables 20 and 21 in Chapter V). There were unique historical
factors operating in the housing market over the last several years that may account for
the drastic changes in the assessment ratios.

6.3 Policy Implications
From a policy perspective, a finding of no finding is significant. When cities are
pressured to encourage the building of dozens of tax-abated homes in a given area with
purported claims of neighborhood revitalization, the question of the effectiveness of such
public investments is what initially prompted this researcher to examine the issue at the
neighborhood level. Moreover, when public officials from an economically-challenged
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city are being persuaded to believe that RPTA is the panacea to all the financial woes of
the city’s neighborhoods (e.g., 8/6/91 Plain Dealer, p. 1F), this study provides evidence to
the contrary of that assertion.
Policy analysis is muddy at best but city officials are pushed to do something, and
RPTA is a popular choice of action because it can be framed as a policy that does not
incur obvious costs to residents; there is no government outlay of funds in order to build,
and officials can claim increased government revenues once the abatement expires.
Further, some studies have shown (namely Bier, et al., 2007) that while there may be
foregone revenue there is also an immediate increment in higher tax revenues related to
the enhanced valuation of the land upon which RPTA homes sit. This outcome permits
public officials to classify RPTA as having immediate positive revenue effects.
An original point broached in the first chapter of this dissertation was a discussion
of the effectiveness of RPTA, with a description of the criteria under which this policy
would be deemed effective. The policy would be effective if RPTA had a statistically
significant relationship in a desirable direction with the chosen set of indicators of
neighborhood change. In other words, the number of RPTA homes in a neighborhood
would be associated with increased private investment, blight removal, decreased number
of crimes, and no change in the distribution of property tax burden.
The results of this study suggest that this policy, as it is currently administered, is
not effective in fulfilling these policy outcomes. Of course one can make a case against
this assertion. Indeed, perhaps the number of tax-abated homes is not robust enough to
be related to changes in the benchmarks of neighborhood progress that were chosen for
this study; maybe the dollar amount of the investment in such construction would yield
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significant associations. Perhaps neighborhood is too large a unit of analysis to uncover
any significant change, but significant relationships may be seen at a smaller level such
as census block group or, as Bates (2006) argues, that defining areas by their housing
submarkets would be a more effective way to distribute revitalization policies. Or
maybe…RPTA is not the panacea some decision makers and developers claim it is in
turning around whole tracts of depressed areas in older urban neighborhoods.
Bates (2006) also concludes from her study that,
Policies that target neighborhoods as though they are homogenous housing areas
may be problematic and lead to policy failures if the policies are being applied are
not appropriate for all parts of the neighborhood. (p. 15)
This assertion implies that housing policies need to be more parochial and tailored to the
unique situations in which Ohio’s urban neighborhoods find themselves. Building on this
point, a further consideration is that maybe RPTA policy would work better in the innerring suburbs where there is a greater likelihood of substitution by home seekers among
similar suburbs than the neighborhoods of a large city. In other words, if interjurisdictional competition is operating properly, offering RPTA in one suburb could draw
residents from other similarly-situated area suburbs. However, offering RPTA may not
have the same effect in drawing people from one urban neighborhood to another, given
the high level of racial polarity from neighborhood to neighborhood and that the public
services are delivered on too large a scale (and therefore perceived as less efficient). The
cities included in this study do not have inherent transportation or access advantage
issues that would significantly impact location decisions in other urban areas. Therefore,
potential homebuyers can move further out from the central business district without
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incurring a burdensome commute. For urban areas without traffic congestion issues,
RPTA may help make inner-ring suburbs more competitive.
In essence it can be argued that RPTA perpetuates the view that Ohio’s city
neighborhoods are undesirable to reside in. First, RPTA is now expected to accompany
the purchase of new construction in the city. Indeed, Bier, et al. (2007) found that a
majority of recent home purchasers in Cleveland knew about RPTA and of those
residents, over 43 percent stated they would not have purchased a home in Cleveland but
for the abatement, and they were also aware of what was available in other cities with
whom Cleveland competes. A second consideration is whether RPTA promotes a sense
of temporary residency, and that moving to “greener pastures” results once the abatement
expires. It would be worthwhile to examine whether homeowners of RPTA property
change their perceptions (or possibly their behavior) about living in urban neighborhoods
post-RPTA.
Building on the Cleveland case study on RPTA by Bier, et al. (2007), this
dissertation sought evidence regarding the effectiveness of RPTA from the perspective of
the public sector. However, the Cleveland study was looking at the policy in terms of
increased tax revenues (or costs) for a particular city; the current study expanded upon
this inquiry to include other Ohio cities and derived a set of desired policy outcomes from
state and local legislation.

6.4 Limitations of the Study
This study takes a tested statistical model used on one public policy and a set of
indicators of neighborhood change and attempts to apply the same process of analysis to
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another policy that can be examined at the neighborhood level, namely RPTA. Although
this analysis was successful and makes a contribution to the conversation surrounding tax
abatement, it is not without flaws. First, it was not easy to gather accurate data for this
study, contrary to Galster, et al.’s (2005) assertion, even after the researcher had
favorable communications with the respective city and county departments regarding her
ability to access the data. Galster et al.’s (2005) assertion may hold if the person
requesting the data is a city or county employee and the request is for data regarding only
one city. The issue of difficult data gathering can be remedied, but only if public
agencies prioritize such requests and also have the technical expertise to extract the data.
A second limitation is with the study sample. While the recommendation would
be to draw a random sample of neighborhoods, the policy under investigation is a statelevel policy. Therefore, geo-political entities within a state comprise the study
population, and it is those entities within the state from which one would draw a sample.
In this particular case, one could expand the sample by including suburbs with RPTA.
A third limitation analyzing this particular policy is that the unit of analysis may
be too large to capture associations between RPTA and changes occurring, but in a
smaller geographic area. However, moving the analysis to a smaller geographic area
necessarily removes one’s ability to test many of the dependent variables representing the
mortgage lending activity. Indeed, there is the potential for a Type II error in this
analysis, whereby there are statistically significant relationships between the independent
variable and the dependent variables but these relationships remain hidden due to the
choice of the unit of analysis. Again, significant differences between the cities may be
revealed at a smaller unit of analysis rather than at tract level.
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A final limitation is the construction of the independent variable. Another
measure of RPTA (median investment amount per tract, for example) may have greater
statistical associations with changes in neighborhoods indicators, and/or may uncover
threshold effects regarding the value of RPTA homes needed in a neighborhood in order
to see relationships between the program and change in neighborhoods. Therefore, a
recommendation for future research would be to conduct the current analysis again using
a more robust measure of RPTA.
In essence, there is a trade-off with changing one’s approach to the research
questions. Compiling data from multiple governmental sources will never be without
some difficulty, especially the further back in time one goes, and in many cases there is
no alternative data source. Expanding the sample size is a noble pursuit, but is
necessarily limited because RPTA is a state-level policy, and the researcher does not have
control over the application of the treatment. A smaller unit of analysis removes one’s
ability to analyze HMDA data since it is only released at the tract level. Using a different
measure of RPTA such as investment values may prove to be more robust but there is an
assumption that such information is accurately recorded and available, especially for
units constructed prior to 2000.
The researcher recognizes that this relatively small, non-random sample limits the
ability to generalize the results beyond large cities in Ohio, which is the defined
population. However, this study was testing the generalizability of a particular statistical
model used in the analysis (Galster, et al., 2004), as well as the usefulness of a set of
previously-examined indicators of neighborhood change meant to capture complex
dimensions of neighborhood constructs (Galster, et al, 2005). A finding of no significant
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statistical relationships does not disqualify the previous study’s results or the results of
the current study. Indeed, Galster et al., (2004) did not uncover significant relationships
in their analysis until they examined only those census tracts above the mean value of the
independent variable. Given the lack of studies examining relationships between
residential tax abatement and change in urban neighborhoods and the practical usefulness
of this study to local policy makers, the chosen approach is relevant. As Shadish, et al.
comment: “Experiments that demonstrate limited generalizations may be just as valuable
as those that demonstrate broad generalization” (p. 19).

6.5 Suggestions for Future Research
In addition to the aforementioned suggestions such as a different measure of the
independent variable, the researcher has other suggestions for future research in the area
of RPTA. First, using a spatial model may result in a more robust analysis of these data.
As Bates (2006) concluded in her spatial analysis of housing markets, predefined
neighborhoods (e.g., census tracts) do not define areas for predicting the housing market
response to policy. Indeed,
areas targeted for revitalization planning do not reflect variations in the housing
market accurately...policy target boundaries could be shifted to more closely align
with housing-quality variations across space. (p. 6)
A second suggestion for future research is to examine the relationship between
RPTA and changes in the racial composition of areas or, more interestingly, examining
the role that RPTA may have in changing people’s perceptions of race, class, and levels
of crime. A third area to be explored in future research is an examination of how the
anti-urban—pro-rural dichotomy continues to impact residential location decisions. This
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researcher argues that until there is a greater understanding of how this push factor is
operating in the collective minds of American homebuyers, urban policies meant to
influence residential choices will fall short of their true ability to impact such decisions.
A final suggestion for future inquiry involves the statement made in Chapter V
regarding a possible disconnect between the supply of funding for housing being made
available in RPTA neighborhoods, and the potential homebuyers willing to invest in the
new housing. This result warrants further examination and could uncover a fundamental
flaw in the way RPTA programs are currently being administered. If a city has secured
the development of RPTA but not secured the confidence of [non-predatory] mortgage
lenders, then RPTA continually will fail to meet its program objectives, whether they are
diminishing blight and crime or increasing investment and tax revenues.

6.6 Concluding Remarks
As Sands, Reese and Khan (2006) noted, incentives have been reported to be
effective as well as ineffective in the literature because of differing methods, variation in
the operationalization of "effectiveness", differing units of analysis and of time periods.
Their general conclusion, and that of Dalehite, Mikesell & Zorn (2005), is that the more
effective abatement programs seem to be local initiatives that are geographically targeted
and evaluated periodically. The conclusion reached in this dissertation does not lend
support to this assertion. Localized RPTA programs, even for the Ohio cities with the
most geographically targeted approaches (Columbus and Dayton), do not appear to be
related to desirable changes at the neighborhood level. In essence, RPTA is not effective
public policy for Ohio’s urban neighborhoods as examined in this study.
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Table A1
Independent Samples Test for Equality of Means between Subject & Comparison Groups
Variable 2001

t

Sig. (2-tailed)

HPMLA

-1.857

.065

HPMLAAR

-0.866

.387

DHPLO

0.325

.746

BIZ

-2.932

.004*

Type I Crimes

-1.401

.165

Type II Crimes

-0.047

.962

Assessment Ratio

1.113

.267

* Significant at p < .05.
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Table A2
Descriptive Statistics for Key Variables for Census Tracts by Group
Median
Change in
Sheriffs’
Sales,
2001 to
2006

Median
Housing
Value,
2003

Median
Change in
Jobs, 2001
to 2006

Median
No. of
RPTA
Units

Subject

137%

$45,700

-10.28%

7

Comparison

118%

$50,975

-8.62%

NA

Median
Dollar
Loan
Amounts,
2005/06

Median
Loan
Approval
Rates,
2005/06

Median No.
of Loan
Applications,
2005/06

Mean No.
Businesses,
2006

Median
No. of
Type I
Crimes,
2006

Median
No. of
Type II
Crimes,
2006

Median
Assessment
Ratio

$76,000 47.85%

78

22

161

177

1.22

$89,250 48.62%

94

32

189

213

1.20
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Table A3 Summary of Regression Coefficients for Subject Group, Significant at p < .05.
Neighborhood Indicators

161

Independent Variables

HPMLAAR

HPMLA

MDHPMLO

BIZ

TypeI

TypeII

AV_SP

RPTA

NS*

4.489E-5^
(.000)

NS

NS

NS

-1.979
(.763)

NS

MHV

NS

.000
(.000)

NS

2.65E-5
(000)

NS

NS

NS

ΔJG

NS

NS

NS

.012
(.007)

NS

NS

NS

Dummy_day

NS

-26.27
(6.664)

NS

NS

-74.51
(16.991)

57.654
(17.848)

.399
(.114)

Dummy_tol

NS

18.16
(4.08)

-14746.47
(4914.125)

-2.063
(1.145)

NA

NA

.512
(.072)

Dummy_col

NS

24.35
(9.281)

25969.38
(9936.22)

NS

NA

NA

-.391
(.149)

SS06

NS

.943
(.147)

-550.09
(113.160)

NS

1.055
(.289)

1.009
(.362)

.010
(.002)

Y01 (pretest)

.502
(.056)

.801
(.052)

.747
(.085)

.944
(.014)

.853
(.043)

.662
(.037)

NS

Constant*

.226
(.033)

NS

21.33
(5.97)

NS

NS

35.96
(10.962)

1.168
(.110)

N
202
202
202
201
166
165
^ RPTA**3 significant at p < .10.
* NS = Not Significant
** Reflected in the constant term is the City of Cleveland, which is the base category for the dummy variables for CITY. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table A4 Summary of Regression Coefficients for Comparison Group, Significant at p < .05.
Neighborhood Indicators

162

Independent Variables

HPMLAAR

HPMLA

MDHPMLO

BIZ

TypeI

TypeII

AV_SP

MHV

1.52-E6 .000
(.000)

NS*
(.000)

NS

NS

NS

NS

-5.607E-6
(.000)

ΔJG

NS

NS

NS

NS

NS

NS

NS

Dummy_day

.079
(.023)

NS

NS

NS

-79.755
(18.896)

NS

.466
(.088)

Dummy_tol

.044
(.019)

NS

NS

-3.932
(1.799)

NA

NA

NS

Dummy_col

.049
(.020)

18.96
(9.304)

NS

NS

NA

NA

NS

SS06

-.001
(.000)

1.27
(.301)

NS

NS

1.509
(.427)

2.489
(.510)

NS

Y01 (pretest)

.199
(.061)

.675
(.107)

NS

1.001
(.012)

.850
(.058)

.631
(.047)

.914
(.196)

Constant*

.299
(.031)

NS

67661.03
(15232.47)

NS

NS

NS

.731
(.164)

N

120

120

119

119

62

62

116

** Reflected in the constant term is the City of Cleveland, which is the base category for the dummy variables for CITY. Standard errors are in parentheses.

Table A5
Model Summary for Outcome Variable Type I Crimes per Capita, 2006
Group

N

R

R Square

Adjusted R
Square

Std. Error of
the Estimate

Subject

166

.806

.650

.633

.0289

Comparison

62

.868

.753

.731

.0217
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Table A6
Model Summary for Outcome Variable Type II Crime per Capita, 2006
Group

N

R

R Square

Adjusted R
Square

Std. Error of
the Estimate

Subject

165

.832

.693

.677

2643.048

Comparison

62

.899

.809

.792

2752.280
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